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INTRODUCTION
The changing nature of the threat posed by global terrorism presents us with a “new 
circumstances”, consequently, necessitating “new measures” to deal with them. The grow-
ing complexity of the issue calls for refl ection on the phenomenon itself, as well as on 
the counter measures taken at national, international and supranational levels. In Central 
Europe, the public debate on global terrorism is often characterised by the portrayal of 
“the enemy” in terms of the ‘clash of civilizations’. The counter measures debate does not 
go beyond the external dimension of national security policies, which are largely viewed 
through the positive lens of international cooperation with the Western allies. This publica-
tion is an outcome of an international conference, “The Fight Against Terrorism – Global 
Challenge of the 21st Century?”, which aimed at emphasizing the complex nature of the 
issue both in terms of geography and substance, and sought to bring the experiences of 
terrorism and counterterrorism beyond the EU and U.S. to the fore. 
The fi rst part of the conference looked mainly at the challenges global terrorism 
poses for the transatlantic partnership. It focused on the “counterterrorism discourse” 
(the interpretation of the diff erent concepts and preferences in the implementation 
of counterterrorism strategies), on diff erences in threat assessment, on the issues of 
human rights and civil liberties, on public opinion, on EU-NATO relations and also 
on the role of the UN and international cooperation. The second part engaged with 
the specifi c experiences of countries that have had a long history of struggle against 
terrorism, namely India, Israel and Turkey. It clearly emerged that current terrorism is 
not limited to the confl ict between Western democracies and Islam. On the contrary, it 
actually poses a greater threat to the Muslim world itself. It is a complex issue that has 
both local and global specifi cities and has much to do with the diff erent ways in which 
local communities are constituted. Concerns were raised about increasing Al Qaeda 
infl uence on local Islamic Jihadi terrorism in non-Arab countries, in connection to 
a forthcoming Al Jazeera broadcasting service in English, as well as about the growing 
use of the Internet as the main recruiting ground, with terrorists exploiting the medium 
in a number of diff erent ways. 
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Originally, the aim of the conference was also to involve speakers from Central 
European countries. However, in the end, the panel on the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and 
Slovak experiences of terrorism and counterterrorism policies could not be incorporated, 
due to time and budgetary constraints. There is a prevailing perception in Brussels that 
the EU eff orts in the area of counterterrorism are being driven by the “old” member states 
and the Central European governments are acting negligently on the issue, namely due 
to a lack of experience, expertise and resources as well as a low level of threat percep-
tion and an generally uninvolved public. In the absence of a panel on Central Europe 
we would like to take the opportunity aff orded by this publication to making some 
observations specifi c to the region here.
Counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe is subject to several parallel 
dynamics; it is to a large extent driven by foreign templates and the pressure to comply 
with measures and regimes agreed internationally. Domestically driven counterterrorism 
policy-making needs a sense of political urgency and a strong impetus from the ruling 
elite. Generally, it is argued that political involvement mirrors the level of security threat 
perception; experts have repeatedly stated that unless there is an imminent crisis situa-
tion caused by an act of terrorism, this tendency is unlike to change in Central European 
countries. Given the sensitivity of the issues, the present political engagement of the 
ruling elites in the region quite often leads to unhealthy over-politicization of selected 
issues and unsystematic solutions. 
As far as the assumption of the uninvolvement of public opinion is concerned, the 
polls show that the threat perception is low and that the Central European public does 
not think that terrorism is the main challenge their countries have to face in the near 
future. However, this should not lead to the assumption that the public is disengaged 
from terrorism and counterterrorism measures. There are public concerns about the 
capacities and preparedness of state institutions to deal with the terrorist challenge. 
Unlike in Western Europe, where the percentages are high not only for the threat 
perception posed by terrorism but also for confi dence in the eff ectiveness of the 
response by the states, the public in Central Europe does not think their countries are 
well prepared. There is high public support for sharing more competencies in the fi ght 
against terrorism with supranational institutions, namely with the EU. However, it is 
diffi  cult to assess whether there is a clear conception of the nature of cooperation and 
future policy priorities. According to available data, it is also diffi  cult to assess to what 
extent the public is interested in actively pursuing counterterrorism policies within 
their states, and which policy moves might be sensitive. In this sense, it is interesting to 
note that Central European public opinion does not seem to be particularly concerned 
about human rights and civil liberties violations in connection with counterterrorism 
measures, despite the paradoxical suggestion that they should instead show even 
greater sensitivity to such issues, as a result of their historical experience of living with 
communist “big brother” regimes.
Despite the historical experiences with terrorism of diff erent kinds, none of the Central 
European countries concerned has so far had to face the consequences of acts of global 
Islamist terrorism; no large scale terrorist attack has ever occurred on their territories, nor 
have their citizens suff ered from terrorist attacks abroad in the way that, for example, 
Australian citizens did in Bali. This said, such experiences do not seem to be the only 
trigger for effi  cient implementation of counterterrorism measures and the development 
of policy priorities. The Netherlands which had long resisted the bolstering of existing 
counterterrorism measures, refusing for example to apply the EU list of terrorist organiza-
tions and individuals, faced a catalyzing event in the murder of the fi lm director Theo van 
Gogh, which triggered major changes in counterterrorism policy. Denmark off ers another 
example. However, the experiences of global Islamist terrorism in the Central European 
countries does not go beyond the threat assessment, preventive monitoring of suspicious 
individuals and protection of critical points and infrastructure. In addition, the experi-
ences of countering organized crime are worth noting – terrorism fi nancing and money 
laundering are interconnected phenomenon, although the record of the Central European 
countries is rather mixed in this fi eld. 
The absence of experience and expertise calls for the use of templates and best practice 
in some areas of counterterrorism policy-making in Central Europe. Pressure from the 
EU and other international institutions to ensure compliance with adopted regimes and 
standards is also needed in order to further develop counterterrorism policies and legisla-
tive frameworks. With regard to the EU counterterrorism agenda, the Central European 
countries are promoting, for example, their timely accession to Schengen, on the pretext 
of modernizing the Schengen Information System, linked to establishing European borders 
management. Generally, there is also broad support for the EU framework for countering 
radicalization, critical infrastructure protection, countering cyber crime and the use of the 
Internet to spread the ideology of radical Islam and the promotion of terrorist techniques, 
including the provisions allowing for removing the illegal content from websites. 
With regard to the lack of expertise and knowledge, as well as the unfi nished reform of 
their security sectors, a willingness to enhance cooperation should be prevalent among 
the Central European member states. However, this is not always the case. The lack of 
adequate fi nance is one factor which plays a role. Another issue is the consistency of the 
proposed measures with existing legal frameworks. The Central European countries are 
largely willing to support proposals for amending the existing laws which do not cause 
problems in terms of deadlines and the implementation burden, which is always greater 
when the measure represents a marked departure from existing provisions. The other 
tendency, observable particularly in case of Poland, is for internal security to remain the 
prerogative of the member states; sometimes used by the politicians in order to safeguard 
and reinforce their sovereignty. Consequently, there is almost no support for establishing 
internal security institutions of the EU or extending the competence of bodies which 
already exist, such as Europol or Eurojust. 
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The Central European countries do not see the EU as the place for developing a coherent 
counterterrorism policy template; rather they feel that it should continue to provide a space 
for the exchange of experiences and allow for the creation of expertise in the fi elds in 
which the Central European countries lack it. That is all right; but the political culture in 
Central Europe in general suff ers from the short-sighted approach of its politicians. Unless 
a very concrete and urgent threat suddenly arises in relation to Central Europe, EU policy 
in this area will continue to lack the immediate pay off  which is needed to make long-term 
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Ladies and Gentlemen,
Terrorists have hit many countries on several continents and they’ve hit people of diff e-
rent religions, including many Muslims. In the fi ght against terrorism each of our countries 
has a dual responsibility. First, of course, to protect its own citizens but secondly, to make 
sure that its territory cannot be used in any way for assisting an attack elsewhere. 
This summer, as Europeans, we have had three lucky escapes; a major attack was 
prevented on transatlantic airlines, in Germany two bombs failed to explode on passenger 
trains and in Denmark what appears to have been a signifi cant plot has been disrupted. 
The fi ght against terrorism must be fi rst and foremost waged by national institutions, by 
national police forces, national intelligence services and national judicial authorities but 
the European Union increasingly has a role to play: that of helping our national agencies 
to cooperate across borders and to work with our partners elsewhere in the world within 
the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
We are developing this role in reaction to what is arguably a changing threat of terrorism. 
The nature of the threat has been changing fairly rapidly over the past number of years. If 
we go back for a moment to 9/11, these attacks were new in several respects. They were 
new in terms of the scope of the acts that hit America: we in Europe were fairly familiar 
with terrorists attacking within specifi c countries, such as the IRA or ETA. Here for the fi rst 
time we clearly had an international dimension, a trans–border dimension. The intensity of 
the attacks was also diff erent from what we were used to in Europe. We were familiar with 
attacks that aimed to produce limited casualties: 9/11 was an attack where the perpetrators 
tried to kill as many civilians as they could. The threat was also diff erent because, whereas 
in the past in Europe the terrorists tried to escape after having perpetrated the attack, here 
we saw a massive use of suicide attackers. 
Since 9/11 we have seen the threat changing again. Al–Qaeda, because its physical 
base in Afghanistan has been destroyed, is no longer the centrally-directed organization 
it perhaps once was. That threat has been replaced by one of a much more decentra-
lized type which incidentally is even more diffi  cult to fi ght. We have seen the rise of 
home–grown terrorism in several of our countries. We’ve seen the rise of the Internet 
as a major terrorist tool not only in terms of spreading the technology to make bombs, 
but also in terms of radicalization and extremist propaganda; and we have seen the 
eff ect of the war in Iraq on some individuals from third countries who have travelled to 
Iraq to join the insurgency, including some from Europe. Of course we don’t know how 
many of them may return but we must take the risk seriously that, when some of them 
return to their countries of origin, they will have picked up the kind of urban warfare 
skills that might be very dangerous for us.
Against that background, what is the role of the European Union and how can we help 
to tackle this changing threat? As I have said, our fi rst line of defence is not Brussels; it is 
and must remain our national institutions, governments and agencies. The EU adds value 
by enabling these agencies to combine forces, to exchange information and best practices 
and to work together in foreign aff airs. In December 2005, the EU adopted its fi rst medium 
term counter–terrorism strategy. That was a document proposed by the then British 
presidency and by myself and it refl ects the experience gained in several of our member 
states in combating terrorism. We have four main key terms that refl ect the themes that 
have been used in the United Kingdom but of course we adapted these concepts to the 
specifi c role of the European Union. 
The fi rst objective is to help prevent people turning to terrorism. It is an issue I would like 
to return to in a little while and it has to do with winning the battle for hearts and minds, 
particularly among mainstream Muslims in Europe and elsewhere in the world. 
Our second objective is to protect Europe’s borders and infrastructure. One way in which 
we do this is by improving security standards of member states, for example, passport 
security. As I am sure many of you know, criminals fairly regularly use false identities and 
false passports to carry on their business. Terrorists also make frequent use of them, so it 
is natural step for the EU to adopt stringent high standards. It has decided to include two 
biometric features into passports; the USA has so far only opted for one, even though it’s 
considering going further. All this is done in the EU on the basis of common international 
standards, working closely with our American partners. Turning to the protection of 
infrastructure, every country needs to ensure the safety of its domestic infrastructure. 
Infrastructure is vulnerable. Most notably, we have seen terrorists targeting the transport 
infrastructure – airlines, trains, subways. In Turkey not long ago an attack was disrupted 
on a cruise ship. In countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, we have also experienced 
attacks on the energy infrastructure, including oil pipelines. A major attack in Yemen was 
prevented only last week on the oil industry. So we must protect these vital industries at 
home but we must also make sure that the trans–border dimension is properly covered 
and the European Commission will shortly issue proposals to this end. 
Our third objective is to pursue terrorists across borders and to bring them to justice. 
That means that we need to exchange information among our police forces, intelligence 
services, judicial authorities and indeed, our border guards. We do that through four main 
channels. The police work together in Europol and Europol is now involved in around 20 
investigations into terrorism. A very recent example of how this works is the name given 
by the British authorities to Europol, which they were able to check against their database 
and clearly demonstrate links with suspect individuals in at least two other EU member 
states. This is an example of how cross border cooperation through Europol is working. We 
have also had a case in Ireland of a terrorist who was sentenced to six years on the basis 
of information gathered by the Irish, French and Dutch police as well as Europol. Eurojust 
brings together our investigating judges and public prosecutors to make sure that when 
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we prosecute terrorists we do so in the country best equipped to deal eff ectively with 
the matter, in view of the nature of the case. Eurojust is now involved in about twenty 
cross-border investigations, as well. The border guards work together through Frontex, 
the agency based in Warsaw. Frontex is now in the frontline of the fi ght against illegal 
migration but it also has an important role in comparing best practice in border protection 
against terrorism. The fourth channel is the Situation Centre (SitCen) which brings together 
analysts from our security and intelligence services. This is a novel development. The EU 
used to have analytical capacity to look at the threats outside its borders; we have added to 
that the internal dimension so that now, for the fi rst time, our interior and justice ministers 
and our foreign ministers have a “helicopter view” not only of the nature of the terrorist 
threat as it aff ects their country, but also as it aff ects neighbouring member states and the 
countries outside the European Union. 
Of course we need to do more than this; we need to bring the terrorists to justice. One 
tool in this respect is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Often the countries are looking 
for a suspect whose whereabouts are unknown. The EAW is a powerful tool to bring these 
people to justice. Since 2004, there have been about 2,000 cases of serious criminals 
being extradited across borders to be put to trial in the countries which had requested 
them. These 2,000 cases include a number which were terrorism-related. In April of this 
year, France and Italy jointly arrested twelve suspects, six in Italy and six in France, all on 
the basis of an EAW.
Our fourth objective is to help our member states respond to a terrorist attack, should 
they require cross-border assistance. Some attacks can be so massive that the national 
emergency services are overwhelmed. In such cases we need to off er cross-border 
assistance. I have just attended a major cross-border European exercise in Denmark and 
Sweden where eight member states brought their emergency services together to train 
for such an eventuality. It is important that we know what assistance countries can off er, 
it is also important for countries to train in and exercise how to receive aid. In practice, 
when you are not only swamped by an emergency but also swamped by off ers of help, it 
is important to be properly prepared.
Now all of this calls for coordination among the ministers and coordination among the 
services at European level. But one important point has to be made – European coordinati-
on cannot be stronger than the coordination on the level of the nation states. The fi rst step 
is to improve coordination between the domestic agencies in the fi ght against terrorism. 
Each member state of EU has to make sure that its police services, security and intelligence 
services, judiciary, custom services and others are joined up and share all necessary infor-
mation. Coordinating mechanisms are essential in this respect. The European Union has 
carried out a peer review into the domestic coordinating mechanism of the member states. 
There is a confi dential version of the document, which of course I am unable to discuss in 
detail, but there is also a public version of the document which can be found on the EU 
Council website. The bottom line is that we need to improve the domestic coordination, 
and simultaneously we need to install mechanisms of democratic accountability. We need 
to do this because in our societies, where the rule of law is paramount, it is essential that 
secret services continue to work fi rmly on the basis of and within boundaries of the rule of 
law. Democratic accountability and a strong role of parliament are essential here. 
What do we expect on the agenda of the EU for the remainder of this year and early next 
year? A priority will be to further improve information exchange, and one proposal on the 
table is to allow our national law enforcement authorities better access to the databases at 
the European Union level and in other member states, be it a DNA databases or databases 
or stolen cars or the like. However, if we do that we must simultaneously strengthen data 
protection; if you exchange more data you must also protect data more, the two have to 
go together – there has to be a balance between liberty and security in the fi ght against 
terrorism. The second main priority has already been mentioned – the infrastructure 
protection. Here the EU has already adopted major pieces of legislation – for example, 
directly after 9/11 the legislation to protect the European airports. We recently added to 
that the legislation to protect the maritime ports of Europe, but more is in the pipeline. 
The third important challenge remains to help prevent chemical, biological or radiological 
material falling into the hands of terrorists. That has an internal, intra–EU component but it 
also means combating the proliferation outside the EU and, for example, the EU is engaged 
with Russia in programmes to help Russia dispense of its surplus stocks of nuclear and 
chemical weapons. Finally, a very important priority for the EU will remain strengthening 
global cooperation in the fi ght against terrorism, because there are three levels at which 
we must work – domestic, the EU and the wider international framework. 
Therefore, working with the international partners is the key to our strategy and, of 
course, our fi rst partner is the United States. In June 2004, at Dromoland Castle in the 
Republic of Ireland, we agreed a Declaration on Combating Terrorism which remains 
the cornerstone of our cooperation and which has since been updated. There are four 
important agreements that the EU and the USA have established: one was to protect 
the security of our containers, in view of the crucial importance of transatlantic trade to 
international trade, of which maritime trade is the very backbone; protecting containers 
traffi  c is essential to protecting our economies. A second agreement is on protecting airline 
passengers – the Passenger Name Records Agreement (PNR). We have two important fur-
ther agreements one on Extradition and another on Mutual Legal Assistance, path-breaking 
and innovative agreements each of them. In addition, we have set up a high-level dialogue 
to discuss border and transport security. I have established good contacts in the past with 
Secretary Tom Ridge of Homeland Security, and with Attorney-General John Ashcroft and 
we work closely with their two successors. There is also solid cooperation on intelligence. 
Intelligence sharing remains central to transatlantic cooperation. I very much hope that our 
current diffi  culties on PNR and on America’s visa waiver can be overcome. Our strategies to 
combat terrorism may diff er occasionally, but transatlantic cooperation continues to refl ect 
the interests of both sides and our achievements in this area are signifi cant. 
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Our second priority on the international level is to strengthen the role of the United 
Nations. It is much to be welcomed that the UN has now agreed the counterterrorism 
strategy for which the EU has campaigned hard. However, we still need to have a com-
prehensive global convention against terrorism. The key to that is to outlaw once and 
for all the practice of terrorism. We need to end the ambiguity and hypocrisy, which lead 
some to suggest that blowing up men, women and children is acceptable as long as it 
is done in a framework of a liberation struggle. Blowing up men, women and children is 
never allowed. Non-combatants should not be targeted, not in war and not in peace time. 
Meanwhile we need to implement the thirteen existing UN conventions and I very much 
welcome that the Czech Republic has completed the ratifi cation of twelve of them. We 
need to develop further the international consensus against terrorism by supporting the 
UN Counterterrorism Committee. One way of doing that is to help developing countries to 
strengthen their defences and that is why the EU has now embarked on capacity–building 
initiatives to work with a number of key countries outside our borders. We are working 
to join up what our member states deliver in terms of assistance and what the European 
Commission delivers in countries such as Algeria, Morocco, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
Synergies in capacity building can be improved further. Through NATO, many EU member 
states are also involved in Afghanistan, which remains a critical country in the fi ght against 
terrorism and indeed the EU itself is a major fi nancial contributor to the rebuilding of that 
country, which we should not allow to slip off  our respective agendas. The security of 
Europe does not stop at our borders. 
There is a fi nal point I would like to make. I am concerned, and I know that I am not 
alone in this, about the process of radicalization of Muslims that we see in parts of Europe, 
in Southeast Asia and in the Arab world. We need to work together across religious divides 
to counter this process. We must do so on the basis of the common principles of human 
rights as contained in the global frameworks. These also deal with the rights of prisoners, 
and we must apply them in full. Should Westerns countries not respect the rights of 
Muslim detainees, that would alienate mainstream Muslims further; and this is the 
background to the statement of the EU foreign ministers agreed on 15 September 2006, 
in which they expressed the hope that the USA would ban secret prisons. That statement 
refl ects the depth of concern in Europe both in public opinion and in parliaments over this 
issue. Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and CIA renditions have diminished America’s standing in 
the eyes of the world and they have made it more diffi  cult to win the hearts and minds 
of Muslims, in Europe and elsewhere. It is of critical importance that we stop the next 
generation of terrorists from being recruited; this means we must win the hearts and 
minds of those Muslims on whose support terrorists depend. I am confi dent that we can 
do that on the basis of our common values; ultimately these values are our best defence. 
Human rights and the respect for human rights is the foundation on which the EU is built, 
and on which the UN has been built. Working to fi ght terrorism within the boundaries of 
human rights is the most eff ective way of addressing long-term threats; and the threat, 
let us not be mistaken, is likely to be long–term. We have had some successes but open 
societies will remain vulnerable for a number of years to come. The level of the threat 
remains high in Europe and elsewhere. I have already mentioned the failed or prevented 
attacks of this summer.
If Europe is to combat this threat eff ectively, it should also refl ect on the way it reaches 
decisions in this area. When the EU ministers have been able to take majority votes on 
important pieces of legislation, we have been successful. The legislation to protect our 
ports, our airports, our passports was based on majority votes, as was the important 
agreement to allow our intelligence, security and police agencies to access information 
concerning details of the telephone conversations that some suspects had had. All of that 
was based on majority voting. Where the EU has more diffi  culty is in reaching decisions 
when unanimity is required. Not too long ago the new director of Europol had to be 
appointed. It took interior ministers more than a year to reach the necessary unanimity 
to appoint this civil servant. I would suggest that is not good enough. We must enable 
our ministers to reach the necessary decisions quickly in the interest of the security of our 
citizens. Of course there are diff erent ideas and it will be for ministers to decide about the 
future of the draft Constitutional treaty. I will not comment on that treaty as it stands, but 
I do believe that from the narrow vantage point of the fi ght against terrorism, it is essential 
that we look again at the way we reach decisions. If the EU is given a job, it should also 
be given the tools to do that job quickly and eff ectively. If not, it would perhaps be better 
for us not to give the EU that job in the fi rst place. Giving the EU a job and not giving it 
the tools to do it is a recipe for public disappointment and a lack of eff ectiveness in areas 
where it is urgently needed.
Three changes, it seems to me, are necessary. Firstly, majority voting needs to be 
introduced in the Council for measures dealing with the most serious issues of cross-border 
crime, secondly, national parliaments and the EP should be involved more and thirdly, 
there should be stronger judicial control, including access by the European Union to the 
European Convention of Human Rights. Judicial and parliamentary control is important 
for keeping the balance between liberty and security.
Ladies and gentlemen, I hope to have given you some impression of what the EU 
does and does not do in the area of the fi ght against terrorism. Its role is to support our 
member states and not to replace them, as it is to work closely with our partners, from 
the USA to the United Nations, as well as from like-minded partners to partners that need 
persuasion. I very much believe that conferences such as these are essential to make the 
public understand what we are trying to achieve and I would like to thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss this with you today. 
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Ladies and gentlemen,
I would like to express my deep thanks for the opportunity to speak on this relevant 
issue, especially because I am not an expert on counterterrorism as my colleague Mr. de 
Vries is. I am very impressed in hearing what he has told us about the systematic and 
eff ective eff orts the EU has taken to take on the terrorist threat in the wake of 9/11. I would 
like to target a more conceptual level concerning the kinds of issues that we face in the 
United States, how those issues, especially the issue of democratic accountability raised 
by Mr. de Vries, complement the eff orts of the institutions like European Union and the 
United Nations, and how in a long run we remain optimistic that we can be eff ective and 
that we can be true to our values. I think it echoes what Mr. de Vries has said and what 
he stands for and it certainly echoes that what historically the United States had stood 
for in the past. 
Departing from my prepared notes, I would like to begin by making a comment about 
part of my experience in Iraq recently. I was the senior American civilian representative in 
the Northern part of Iraq and I was part of the team that did the fi nal inspections of the 
Abu Ghraib prison when it was closed. I was charged with overseeing the largest prison 
once Abu Ghraib closed; this is Badush in Mosul. After Abu Ghraib we made sure we looked 
through both the civilian and the military fi les and experience so that there would be no 
repeat of what happened there. When we set up our oversight under the human rights 
group under my authority in Northern Iraq, we made sure that a close watch would be kept 
on the way both the military and the civilians, the Americans and the Iraqis oversaw the 
largest facility in Iraq. Does this mean that we had somehow been able to wash away our 
horror at what we have seen at Abu Ghraib? It certainly does not; it doesn’t mean that we 
were able to look back and say somehow this was acceptable, that we had overcome this 
experience and could wipe it from our memory – quite the opposite. I submit to you that 
one of the things that you as our friends and we as a country hold dear is that we are able 
to learn from our mistakes. That is to say that what we have achieved in Badush, certainly 
during the time when I was in Iraq and I hope under my successors, makes it very unlikely 
that the kind of excesses that were carried out in the fi ght against terrorism would be 
repeated. My point is that thorough the battles that we are fi ghting in the coming years, 
what we will see is attempts by those people to be eff ective whether they go astray; that 
we have a kind of corrective mechanism within our societies and can correct those mistakes, 
those abuses. I am certainly very mindful of the context in the history of Europe, of the 
legacy of the world wars that have been fought across the continent, and the fact that 
the existence of terrorism after the calm that came out of it was something that was a low 
level but ever present threat for you. This was something that, as you may know, in our 
country was something we forgot. We believed somehow that we were immune to these 
kinds of issues and behind our European friends both in our perceptions of how we dealt 
with terrorism and how we perceived it. It is unfortunate that we were awakened in the 
1990´s and the fi rst years of this century in a rather sudden way, to which our democratic 
system has responded as best as it can but in a way that has been with fi ts and starts and in 
a way that to the outside eye has sometimes seen as contradiction or at least inconsistent 
with what we stand for. 
I believe, however, that what we have done recently – our work with the EU, with the 
individual nations of Europe, our work with the countries outside of Europe and around 
the globe – has been something that has been very successful and which has addressed 
the initial threats posed by terrorism. For us it is a very important issue not to forget that 
terrorism is more than a criminal act, that it is an ideologically-based assault, one that 
deliberately targets civilians on a massive scale, one that is against tolerance and the way 
we live our national lives as Western democracies. Given the attacks that we face, there are 
many times when military means are the appropriate response. Otherwise, we are going to 
lose more of our people. I don’t think it is a question of there being a diff erence between 
us and our European friends, but I recognise that it is something we need to explore more 
carefully when, not if, military force is most appropriate. 
Another personal note, I was raised a Quaker. It is a religion of pacifi sts and while I very 
much respect the tenets of those who believe the violence is never right, I strongly believe 
personally that there are times when force is necessary. It is this issue of deciding when, 
with whom and how force is necessary that I believe we have the greatest work ahead at 
the conceptual level with our European friends. This has been part of the reasons why we 
had so many misunderstandings in the years since 9/11; where we had started with such 
an outpouring of support from our European allies, which has slipped away over the last 
years. I believe this misunderstanding or at least the lack of common position on the use 
of force is something we have to explore – why is it, why so many people in Europe are 
against the use of force at all, why is it that many people in Europe are sceptical about the 
way the Americans utilize force. We need to talk about it at this conceptual level as well 
as at the very real levels of counterterrorism Mr. de Vries has mentioned. 
Part of my motivation for going to Iraq was because I believe there is a need to use force, 
there are people that will do violence to us and we need to resist them by the force. The 
question once again is, how do we that? We have witnessed much in the last few years; we 
are fi lled with the images of Afghanistan and Iraq, of Madrid and London, Guantanamo and 
car bombs and coffi  ns being lowered as fl ags are folded. In the transatlantic relationships 
during this time and during the level of great fear and uncertainty and of course with the 
diff erences over our policies in Iraq, there has nonetheless been an extremely fruitful set 
of goals that have been achieved thorough our common eff orts and I am pleased that at 
the working level we have done very well. What it has done to us however is that it has 
brought changes to the United States; we’ve spent last fi ve years simultaneously fi ghting 
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terrorism but also evolving into a nation that has become more familiar with the domestic 
threat of terrorism. And we have not fi nished this process; we hope this process will be 
a process that we share with you, our friends, we hope you will contribute to our process 
as you have done so much in the last 200 years. I think it is a remarkable process to me at 
least how after 9/11 we have built the kinds of structures where we can make those kind 
of agreements as we made in 2004 in Ireland with the EU and how we have developed the 
personal links with the people in Europe and in the world to fi ght terrorism.
In the post 9/11 world, these diffi  culties in transatlantic relations have led to diff ering 
perspectives and, in fact, many times they have been rhetorical, causing diffi  culties in 
both of our domestic situations. The policy diff erences do exist and there are legitimate 
concerns between friends, but overall, I believe that very clear cooperation exists today 
between the United States and our European allies. The most striking diff erences are in the 
public perception of the U.S. policy. Whereas the United States sees its eff orts in the world 
as inextricably linked to the support of freedom, democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
security, Europeans often view U.S. policies with suspicion. This comes, in part, from kind 
of choices we have had to make. We in the U.S. believe we have been compelled to act. 
Mr. de Vries mentioned in his comments those structural impediments to more eff ective 
European response that he very honestly presented to you and on which he has off ered 
his suggestions. We, too, have impediments to how we respond to terrorism but I submit 
that our response perhaps goes in the other direction. We are sometimes very quick to act 
and perhaps sometimes too slow to refl ect. I believe that these kinds of diff erences in our 
responses to the terrorist challenge have built up to misunderstandings; and I think that 
over the next few years we will be able to work on those things together. However, we do 
believe that we must be forthright and eff ective in protecting both our citizens, the citizens 
of our allies and the citizens of our friends against those who plan the attacks, whether they 
plan them in Hamburg, in Mosul or whether they even plan them in the United States. 
We are charged with ensuring the safety of our citizens and we have often had to 
decide on what is and what is not an acceptable practice to prevent killings. The people 
of our countries are themselves the governments´ most sacred charge and in making our 
decisions, in protecting our people, we struggle to be both eff ective and just. Therefore, 
human rights are crucial as the principles of international law, and there will never be peace 
and security without them. Our critics repeatedly raise the inconsistencies and diffi  culties 
in our policies but we in the United States are aware of the tensions between liberty and 
security and we do not take our decisions lightly. We are giving birth to a new paradigm, 
if you will, of ensuring international security whilst at the same time fi ghting to protect 
ourselves with all the tools, military and legal, that have been left to us from an earlier age. 
The internal U.S. debate on how to go about this is not simply another manifestation of 
partisanship in U.S. domestic politics. We are, therefore, in America working hard to try to 
deal with these issues straightforwardly and in a non–political way. The internal debate 
in the United States is a manifestation of the democratic process itself as we adapt to the 
domestic terrorist threat. If we jeopardize that which defi nes our concept of ourselves, we 
would have lost something special, something that has allowed us to be a beacon for many 
others in the dark times of the past. I don’t believe we are at that point. Such concepts as 
justice, liberty and objective truth are not going to be discarded as a result of the struggle 
with terrorists; these concepts underpin American consciousness and we will, with your 
help, fi nd the equilibrium in our approach to terrorism as it matures over the years and 
because the fi ght against terrorism is global, it is not the only fi ght we have. 
We must never confi ne ourselves to looking to the future only through the lens of the 
fi ght against terrorism, somehow leaving the rest of our work, whether it is to fi ght AIDS, 
to fi ght hunger or injustice. We have to work through these issues of poverty, instability, 
health and environmental challenges through the world. Without progress on these issues, 
we will never solve the questions related to terrorism; so as we face the future together 
dealing with terrorism in the 21st century, we will depend largely on who we are and 
what we do together in all aspects of the international society. We are friends and allies, 
not afraid to speak openly about the diff erences, committed to fi nding the way forward. 
As long as we have this dynamic relationship, I believe we can address terrorism and any 
other challenge we face. It is, in fact, our greatest tool in this fi ght.
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■   Is the threat of terrorism real? 
■   One of the key priorities is to win the “hearts and minds” of the mainstream Muslims in 
Europe, specifi cation of how to achieve this and the importance of “hearts and minds” of 
the EU citizens. 
■   Use of force as a key problem in the transatlantic relations?
■   Only a descriptive approach to terrorism; why the roots of terrorism are not being explored? 
What will the “changing” United States do in order to despatch the root causes of terrorism? 
■   Preventing recruitment, what community development the EU employs, eff orts to engage 
Muslim community.
■   Slow extradition procedures between Asian and European countries.
■   Developments in Iraq and the implications for Jihadi terrorism elsewhere.
■   U.S. short–sighted counterterrorism strategy in dealing with India and Pakistan – rather 
tactical alliances.
■   Would EU be more eff ective in counterterrorism if it turned to federal model? 
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Gijs de Vries: 
I do remember the article in the Foreign Aff airs which suggests that the threat 
of terrorism is exaggerated but if we look at the number of victims, the number of 
countries hit and at the threats which disrupted Europe over the summer, the threat 
is real; there is no question about that. Also the stated intentions of those who claim 
to be inspired by Osama bin Laden and his followers leave absolutely no doubt about 
their determination to continue. The threat is real; however, it is not a threat that we 
need to face by compromising the values on which our societies are based. Let us not 
forget that the human rights treaties, which were drafted right after the WWII, were 
drafted precisely with atrocities of that war in mind and they were drafted to provide 
guidance to policymakers in rough times. Human rights treaties are not fair-weather 
documents; they are documents to be used in diffi  cult times; including the ones we 
are living now. 
Are we losing? I think that would much too facile a judgement. Many plots have been 
disrupted, many terrorists have been arrested. Al Qaeda’s physical base in Afghanistan 
has been destroyed by the use of force on the basis of a UN mandate and with the 
support of the international community, including European countries. There have 
been real successes. But it is clear that we are witnessing a process of radicalization, 
which is multidimensional and which diff ers from place to place and over time. We 
need to counter the rhetoric of the extremists and those who seek to recruit people into 
terrorism. The best way to do that is to insist on the fundamental principles on which 
civilized societies are based. Violence is unacceptable in a democracy; democracies are 
the antithesis of violence. People have to respect that, whether they are Christians, Jews, 
atheists, Muslims or whoever. This is also my response to the question on winning the 
hearts and minds of non–Muslims; we have to stick to the essence of our civilization 
and that is the rule of law, individual liberty and the responsibility to respect laws. If 
laws are broken, whether by Muslims or non–Muslims, then the perpetrators should 
feel the full force of law. People who engage in violence should be brought to trial, 
judged, and, if found guilty, convicted. If we do that, if we apply our principles and 
stick by them, we will prevail. Look at what happened in Madrid and in London after 
the attacks: It is always the strategy of terrorists to provoke an overreaction so that 
Western governments compromise on the values their societies are based on. But this 
did not happen: the British and Spanish people reacted with great dignity and calm to 
the terrible events that had befallen them. It shows that Western democracy is much 
stronger than the terrorists think; and not just Western democracy. In the countries 
like Indonesia, which has been hit several times by terrorist attacks the local terrorist 
organization Jemaah Islamya has campaigned actively to have the Indonesians adopt 
an Islamic kind of state. Indonesians have looked at that demand and they have 
rejected it overwhelmingly. The biggest Muslim nation on this planet has participated 
in democratic elections for the presidency and parliament, rejecting the Islamist thesis 
and showing that there is compatibility between democracy and Islam. So these values 
are strong and we must build on them. 
The question about the roots of terrorism – shouldn’t we be targeting the roots rather 
than talking about the defi nition? I think we should be careful when talking about the 
roots of terrorism. First of all, there are diff erent kinds of terrorism and we must not lump 
everything together. Secondly, too often to my taste, discussing the roots amounts to 
justifying or somehow minimizing the importance of terrorism: terrorism is wrong, for 
whatever reason, whatever its roots and we should build on that principle. That does 
not mean to say that we should not be addressing some of the grievances which are 
being expressed, including the search for justice in the world, including the search for 
democratic and accountable government in Muslim countries, including the complaints 
about how the European countries treat their minorities. These concerns are real and we 
must take them into account. 
A brief comment on wise and constructive intervention by Mr. Munter – I am not quite 
sure that the key issue that the European and Americans should be discussing is the use 
of force because I believe there is a role for use of force in the fi ght against terrorism. The 
use of force can be a major tool and Afghanistan is there to show it; yesterday and today 
we must use force to fi ght the Taliban who are trying to claw back power in Afghanistan. 
There is no other way, we must do it and we are doing it. I do believe we have to talk about 
the interpretation of the common principles that we established after WWII. Let’s apply 
these principles because they are a source of strength.
I must confess (this may surprise you) that I am a little sceptical about the federal 
model. The EU is a very diverse phenomenon. Probably the best way to combat terrorism 
in such a diverse unit is to do it bottom up and not top down; to do it through the existing 
organizations that know their country best and by allowing those organizations to work 
together, rather than by creating a federal structure. To be quite specifi c, I am not so sure 
whether a European FBI or CIA, should we have the legal basis to create them, would be 
that much more eff ective. 
As to community development, I am not an expert in the fi eld but I believe it can play 
a role. I visited the Philippines not long ago and in Mindanao there is a very interesting 
project going on between Christian and Muslim farmers who combine forces in order to 
have better lives. That is the kind of practical work that is enormously important, it is not 
abstract and it works. It is not of course a cure but it can be part of the solution. We have 
to look at what is happening in our societies in Europe; there is certainly a search in many 
of our member states for the best way to build a society which would accommodate all 
minorities. It can be done but we have to invest a lot of eff ort in it.
As to extradition, I do not know enough about the specifi c case of the 8-year long 
extradition procedure between India and Portugal which was mentioned. Within the EU, 
Questions / Comments and Answers
 Keynote speeches 
the process has speeded up signifi cantly; it used to take a year between the member 
states, now it is down to little over a month. One of the suspects of the aborted second 
bombing eff ort in London in July was caught in Italy and he was extradited to the UK 
in 40 days. As far as third countries are concerned, it very much depends in practice on 
the factual information provided by third countries to the EU member state concerned. 
I know of several cases where judges in the EU member states have felt that a third country 
requesting extradition simply had not made out its case. 
Iraq very briefl y, there is no question that the war in Iraq has complicated the fi ght 
against terrorism but we cannot stop at saying that. There is equally no question that 
the fi ght against terrorism would be complicated even further if we would not do our 
utmost to help the Iraqis fi nd peace with themselves and to fi nd the peace with their 
neighbours. We need to help Iraq to build a stable environment. That will be a long term 
eff ort; it will require a great deal of investment and patience. There will be setbacks; it 
is going to be a rough and diffi  cult process but I can see no alternative but to continue 
doing that work. The EU is trying to contribute modestly to that eff ort, for example by 
the training of about 600 judges and prosecutors so that the instruments of a functioning 
state in Iraq can be built.
Cameron Munter: 
I think we can look at this morning’s newspapers, in which the debate in the United 
States over the Geneva conventions has taken a very constructive turn. It is happening in 
the United States, within a democratic country, where there is criticism of those who are in 
power and where there is a debate going on between those who are in power and those 
who oppose them, not necessarily only on partisan grounds but on such questions like the 
rules of war. You will fi nd that a compromise is being hammered out about the approach 
to Geneva protocols. It is an exact illustration of what Mr. de Vries is talking about; the 
discussion of those concepts which we have developed, not only since WW II, but indeed 
since the WW I, since the beginning of global institutions trying to cope with our common 
problems, we must maintain these principles in their current ways whilst adapting them 
to the challenges we face.
It is also worth thinking about the question of justice. In American rhetoric great value 
is placed on freedom to that extent that it sometimes trumps other elements of what we 
think of as the ingredients for a successful democratic society such as equality and justice. 
Sometimes justice is simply not heard as loudly as freedom. I think many of our friends in 
the Arab world will raise the question of justice, asking whether the way the world works is 
just. That kind of question, is a very good exercise for us, because it gets us back once again 
to Mr. de Vries’s question – how do we explain the existence of popular grievances? Is it 
that we are perhaps using a rhetoric that is sterile to those who hold such grievances, and 
they in turn are using one that is sterile to us? Looking at the word justice or the concept 
behind the word justice, I hope that we can make some progress.
Now the question about whether terrorism is a myth. Two journals were mentio-
ned – Foreign Aff airs and National Interest, please do not make the mistake of looking at 
the U.S. as a monolithic country; of course there is creative dissent in the United States, 
of course there are people who will be as honest as possible about their disagreement 
with the way that our government has worked. That is one of our greatest strengths. So 
yes, we have people who are claiming (and they have every right to claim), that a threat 
has been misunderstood, used or, twisted. I can only say for my part, that I entirely agree 
with Mr. de Vries, that the threat is real that those people who work on counterterrorism 
thorough the world, not only in America or Europe but also in Asia and elsewhere know 
that there is a very real threat. 
As to the use of force, I did not want to give the impression this is the main question 
that separates Europeans and Americans. It is simply one that has a tendency to divide 
Americans from the very deeply-held beliefs of Europeans; and if one pays attention 
to what happened in the last century, it would be astonishing if European beliefs were 
diff erent from what they are. Finding a common ground on when and how it is appropriate 
to use force is one of our biggest tasks; that was the point I was making. I don’t want to 
caricature all Europeans as people who hope the bad things will just go away all on their 
own and all the Americans as policemen, protecting the Europeans; that is a false image. 
We simply have to talk about the ways we apply force and how they are consistent with 
what we want to achieve.
About the process of change and how we can achieve results in the U.S. One example is 
our government’s attempts to deal with the issue of secret prisons. How internees shall be 
treated is part of the debate and the way we think about interrogations is being reassessed 
by the government. We are not going to stop questioning people who are legitimate 
suspects in the war on terror, because we want the public to be safe. However, from our 
Supreme Court decisions and from our new legislation in the U.S., I believe we are going 
to see changes in the way we do this; not to compromise our eff ectiveness but to improve 
our image in the world. 
On Iraq I would add that the kinds of eff orts mentioned by Mr. de Vries are perhaps lost 
in the reports about the car bombs and the ethnic violence. There are international eff orts, 
not only involving the EU or U.S. but also the Japanese or Koreans, to have judges and police 
trained not only in keeping order but in representing citizenship, to have people working 
in economic fi elds and so on; that is not only to cope with the many years of dictatorship 
but to cope with Iraq as a battleground. I agree that it is diffi  cult, but in fact, it did not 
begin with Iraq and it is not likely to end with Iraq either.
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Addressing the question of Pakistan, I am not an expert in the region but the American 
lack of attention and the tendency seen by the rest of the world in tactics sometimes 
overlaps with the fact that we are a global country, dealing with global issues; that is we 
do not tend to look at regional issues, we tend to see issues that themselves might be 
regional, such as the borders between India and Pakistan, as they fi t globally. Whether 
we have made the right choice or not is open to argument, but what we welcome is that 
many of our colleagues from India, Pakistan or Europe are choosing to see the issues in 
the global context, too. It may not be the same global context that we see, but at least 
the debate about the broad terms of what we do has begun. When somebody criticizes 
our support of Jihadists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, we can begin to talk about that over 
a longer period of time. Up until the end of the Cold War, only very few nations chose 
to see these questions in a global context. Since the beginning if 21st century, there are 
more countries looking at these kinds of problems and the links between terrorists who 
are on certain borders of central Asia and those who are in the United States. One of the 
unexpected benefi ts of the war on terror is that we all are trying to see things globally 
in a more strategic way.
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I would like to begin by referring to a recent public opinion survey released by the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends. It is an annual survey 
of public opinion in the United States and twelve European countries which addresses 
foreign policy issues facing the U.S. and Europe today. This year’s survey fi ndings relate to 
today’s topic of counterterrorism strategies in the context of U.S. – Europe relations. The 
main fi nding this year was that, although Europeans have not changed their critical views 
of the Bush administration, the views of Europeans and Americans toward global threats 
and challenges are much closer than one would believe if one simply read the newspapers 
that tend to focus on the transatlantic divide. 
Five years after 9/11, we found that the most important and most pressing threat on the 
both sides of the Atlantic was international terrorism. This is surprising in several regards. 
Firstly, we might have thought more Americans than Europeans would feel threatened 
by terrorism. There are also those who said that the threat of terrorism would fade after 
9/11. There were those in Germany, who argued, the international terrorism was really an 
Anglo–American problem, related to the war in Iraq. This appears not to be the case in 
the minds of the publics. After the thwarted bomb attacks on regional trains in Germany 
this past summer, a very important change occurred in the German discussion about the 
nature of the threat posed by international terrorism. In addition, it is striking that the 
largest change from the last years, both in the United States and Europe, was on the threat 
of the so-called Islamic fundamentalism; it was up 13 points in the U.S. and up 11 points 
in Europe. It suggests that Americans and Europeans are seeing these issues similarly in 
some ways. Further, both Europeans and Americans saw the threat of a nuclear Iran as 
more pressing than the threat of violence and instability in Iraq.
The survey contains a couple of questions that go beyond threat perception. Americans 
and Europeans might see the world similarly, but would they agree on what to do about 
it? We asked questions about civil liberties and again, if you read the newspapers you 
might think that Americans feel so threatened by the prospect of another attack that 
they are willing to surrender their civil liberties; Europeans, on the other hand, are said 
to be more used to terrorism and more cautious. We asked: “Would you support greater 
governmental authority in the eff ort to prevent terrorism to install cameras in public places, 
monitor the internet, monitor citizens´ phone calls, and monitor banking transactions?” 
We chose those four items because we though they would be broadly applicable; in the 
U.S. for instance, there is a great debate on public library records, but this would not have 
the same connotations in Europe. 
On these four policies, we found a surprising amount of agreement on where to draw 
the line on civil liberties. Americans and Europeans overwhelmingly agree that the gover-
nment should have greater authority to install surveillance cameras in public places. They 
also agree, although by a lesser margin, that the government should have greater authority 
to monitor internet communications. They also agree that the government should not have 
the authority to monitor phone calls and they diff er somewhat on whether the government 
should have the authority to monitor banking transactions, with more Europeans in favour 
than Americans. The results are more similar than many would expect. I was struck reading 
the comment by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in which she said: “For us, it is about 
fi nding the balance between surveillance cameras, which I am completely in favour of, 
data protection and basic human rights, which we must be very cautious about.” The 
survey did not focus exclusively on the issue but in some ways it gives us confi dence that 
there is a room for us to talk beyond the elites, specialists and experts; that the U.S. and 
in European publics are perhaps not so far apart. 
The second issue I would like to turn to is the debate on terrorism in the U.S., which 
should be understood as a debate about the power of the executive branch of govern-
ment. What is happening within the United States is a debate about the authority of the 
President to make decisions related to terrorism and counterterrorism activities. I don’t 
know how much of this debate makes it off  our shores, so let me emphasise that there 
have been a series of cases in the judicial branch of government, the Supreme Court, which 
have slowly made their way forward. The most recent one is the Hamdi versus Rumsfeld 
case. To simplify, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the United States had to respect the 
Geneva conventions in dealing with prisoners; that the President has no “blank check” to 
do as he wishes in the war on terror. A compromise about U.S. legislation concerning the 
treatment of terrorism suspects was already mentioned by Mr. Munter in his presentation. 
You are probably aware, although it is easy to personalize the U.S. in its President, that 
he or she does not have legislative authority in the way many prime ministers have in 
European systems. The debate in the Congress is an extremely important one. After the 
Supreme Court decision, the President called for Congress to write legislation that would 
codify what is permitted and what is forbidden in the war on terror, as he sees it. He made 
some very strong claims about what should be permitted and what has been striking is 
that, although the Republicans currently control both Houses of Congress, his party had 
a debate within the Senate led by three prominent Senators – John McCain, John Warner 
and Lindsay Graham – which challenged the President on the issue. They refused to support 
legislation that followed the President’s directive as given because of concerns about the 
way it would weaken U.S. morale and legitimacy and, in their own words, put our own 
soldiers at risk. I would urge you to follow this legislation because the debate within the 
United States very much concerns the extent and the powers of the diff erent branches of 
government. The debate on wiretapping in the United States is really a debate about the 
need for judicial oversight; it is not a debate on whether or not wiretapping is permissible 
but about the extent of the power of the President to engage in wiretapping.
We are having “midterm” congressional elections in November, and one could ask 
whether terrorism is a partisan issue in this election. In the Transatlantic Trends survey, we 
can break down the public by party affi  liation and, in fact, among the general public, there 
is no diff erence between Republicans and Democrats on the perception of the threat of 
terrorism. The question is whether it would make a diff erence if the Democrats were to 
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take a majority in one of the houses of Congress. We are having a discussion about this at 
the moment because we know from other public opinion polls that it is only on terrorism 
that the Bush administration currently receives above 50 % approval; on all other issues it 
is below 50 %. We are seeing this issue coming into to the public eye at a time when they 
are arguing very hard about the congressional elections and prospects for Republican 
candidates. There is often a lot of anguish over the lack of dramatic new ideas from the 
Democrats, and terrorism is one of those diffi  cult issues in a way because most of the 
people don’t disagree about whether terrorism is important. Disagreements tend to be 
about something less glamorous, such as diff erences about how to deal with terrorism. 
Arguments in both parties tend not to be about whether we deal with terrorism, but whe-
ther we can deal with it better, perhaps in a way that respects our values or international 
treaties more. The results of these elections refl ect tensions between the diff erent branches 
of the government, such as the ability of Congress to limit or empower the President in this 
fi eld. In many ways, this will be the domain in which we will see America moving forward 
in one direction or another.
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Before tackling the EU approach to counterterrorism, EU–NATO relations, cooperation 
between the U.S. and European governments and public opinion, a couple of general 
comments, important for understanding the subject, should be made. The fi rst problem 
with counterterrorism is that it is not a policy area in itself, it is truly a horizontal policy; it 
covers police and judicial cooperation, foreign and defence policy and it can even involve 
environmental ministries. It is truly cross–departmental, already diffi  cult to organize at the 
national level and some governments do better at it than others; so it is obvious how diffi  cult 
it is to get 25 EU governments to join up their services and cooperate at the EU level. Secondly, 
if you look at the EU and its approach to counterterrorism, most of it (perhaps over 95 %) is 
done nationally. Even when it involves cross–border cooperation, the basis is mostly bilateral 
and there is a long history of this in Europe. Examples of this are the cooperation of the British 
and Irish governments dealing with terrorists in Northern Ireland or the French and Spanish 
governments, who have established a centre in Pyrenees, partly to keep an eye on ETA. On 
the other hand, we should not forget that the EU is still important because the threat we face 
today is very diff erent from the threat we faced from the IRA, ETA or the Red Brigades; it is truly 
international, it moves in and out of Europe, it involves home-grown terrorists, foreigners and 
non–Europeans; this is why we need European, transatlantic and global cooperation.
As to the EU’s response to terrorism, Mr. de Vries has listed everything that the EU is doing 
and indeed, on paper, it is a very impressive list. There is a long Action Plan of about 175 
diff erent measures; it covers absolutely everything from infrastructure protection to foreign 
policy, internal coordination, intelligence sharing or police and judicial cooperation. The 
problem is that most of these measures have not been implemented; only about 35 of the 
175 measures have actually been carried out. Some of those measures are of course more 
important that the others.
The concrete measures that have been useful are things like European Arrest Warrant or 
the European Evidence Warrant – the concrete police and judicial issues. Frontex, the border 
agency, is trying to strengthen cross border cooperation as well as intelligence sharing. The 
Situation Centre (SitCen) is very important not only because it is trying to bring together the 
internal and external intelligence assessments. One must bear in mind that SitCen does not 
deal with the raw intelligence; it is about creating a strategic overview, but bringing together 
the internal and external in order to address the threat we face, is also absolutely crucial. It is 
also interesting that SitCen is developing a role in monitoring websites of Islamists; it is fairly 
uncontroversial but this is the fi rst time SitCen has been given a more operational role and is 
not just depending on information from member states. It is extremely useful because the 
internet is one of the main tools the Islamists use to disseminate information, training and 
so on and that is the area where the EU can be very useful.
The EU strategy, which is remarkably similar to the UK strategy of four P’s, is a very good 
step because before December 2005 we had a very long list of measures but no real overview 
of how we were approaching these issues. The problem is that the list of measures remains 
very long, containing all the world’s problems that we have to solve before we can cope with 
terrorism; and that is impossible. To give one example – radicalization, of course, it is a crucial 
issue but I do not see what the EU can do about it, particularly given the large Muslim popu-
lations in Europe and the focus on the home-grown Islamist terrorism. It is up to the British, 
French or Dutch governments to think about integration in their own countries. It is not for 
the EU to start commenting on social integration and how to work with communities. 
There is one aspect that has been largely ignored in the debate and that is the role of EU 
foreign policy. We tend to focus on the internal threat in the EU; there is much less debate 
about what the EU can do outside Europe to help to cope with the international terrorism, 
in particular, working with the non–European governments, be they Egyptian or Pakistani. 
Capacity building, for example, sending out trainers, judges or policemen, is important. The EU 
can do a lot more of this. Pilot schemes with the Philippines, Indonesia and Pakistan have been 
started by the European Commission, which is sending money to help support their intelligence 
services and emergency response. The problem is that the European Commission is not sure 
where that money is going. There is not enough capacity within the Commission to assess the 
capacity building projects, which are being carried out outside Europe. There is also a problem 
of priority of goals. In Algeria, for example, the EU runs a judicial capacity building operation, 
but the Algerian president, Abdelaziz Boutefl ika, recently jailed some independent-minded 
judges, whom he did not like. This raises the question whether it is right for the EU to continue 
to work with the judiciary in Algeria, promoting more judicial independence, whilst constrained 
to work with a government capable of undermining it in this way. This is an open question and 
it really is a diffi  cult issue. The U.S. has made clear that spreading democracy and promoting 
human rights is the best way to win the so-called “war on terror” and the EU appears to agree, 
although it is a lot more timid in its statements. It does not talk about it very much but the 
promotion of democracy throughout the broader Middle East means you have to be prepared 
to talk to Islamists, especially when they get elected like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or 
Hamas and Hezbollah elsewhere. We may not like that but it is the reality. 
A fi nal point on EU cooperation: apart from what is happening in Brussels and the 
debates on the Action Plan, there is a lot of interesting cooperation going on in the various 
groups of governments; there is the G–6 group, consisting of the six biggest countries in 
Europe – Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland, which is trying to share 
intelligence more closely. Frankly, they don’t want to share with everybody else, they do 
not trust all the governments in the EU since not all governments have the same kind of 
intelligence procedures. I am in favour of this; close cooperation in some form is better than 
none at all, and I am confi dent that eventually more countries will become involved. A lot 
of EU initiatives have started this way, as in the case of Schengen, but some of the smaller 
EU member states are not happy about this development. Another example is the Treaty 
of Prum, which was signed by seven member states last year to intensify their police and 
judicial cooperation. The signatories declared that the other EU member states are welcomed 
to join in 2008 and there is a lot of speculation that it might become an EU wide measure 
by the end of decade. 
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Turning to EU and NATO relations; in the debates about counterterrorism NATO is not 
discussed as much as it used to be; it is true that in Europe the EU is very much a focus of 
cooperation, mainly because there are no interior ministers in NATO, and it does not have 
an aid policy. It is a military alliance focusing on defence policy and, for Europeans, defence 
policy is part of counterterrorism, but it is relatively insignifi cant compared with police and 
judicial. There are real problems in EU–NATO relationship at the moment but it is not about 
counterterrorism; it has to do with the dispute between Cyprus and Turkey and with the 
deeper issues between France and the U.S. about the future of NATO. However, it means 
that they do not talk to each other about counterterrorism, only issues like Bosnia, because 
it is a joint EU–NATO operation and capabilities (since everybody agrees there is a need of 
more capabilities) are being discussed. There is no discussion about Afghanistan where 
NATO could use a lot more EU help on the civilian side, neither is there any discussion on 
practical counterterrorism. This could be particularly benefi cial, for example, on infrastructure 
protection or emergency response, especially given the NATO expertise with the nuclear, 
chemical, and biological threats. At the moment, both NATO and the EU have their own 
separate programmes; the assets in these areas could be shared. Turning to the emergency 
response, I took part in a seminar on the emergency response held in Brussels couple of 
months ago; representatives of both the Commission and the Council were present. I asked 
a simple question; when an emergency arises, particularly a cross-border attack where 
presumably the EU might have a role in coordinating the response, who speaks for the 
EU – is it Gijs de Vries, Franco Frattini or Javier Solana? The Commission representative told 
me she did not care who spoke for the EU, she only cared for who spoke for the Commission 
and that would be Franco Frattini. The Council representative responded it would probably 
be Javier Solana. Why can’t there be one person? Ordinary citizens may not be interested in 
whether it is an EU Commissioner or a Council representative who speaks, but I was, and it 
emerged for a single person to speak, a Treaty change is needed. Do we really need Treaty 
change in order to have a spokesperson so that the EU can send a single message to the 
citizens after an attack?
Returning to my EU–NATO point, what is truly worrying is the slow build up of institutional 
rivalry. Obviously, the EU assumes it is important for counterterrorism, NATO assumes it is more 
important since it has more capacities. Part of the explanation resides also in the interagency 
politics in Washington; the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice and 
the FBI are quite happy to work with the EU, but not everyone in the State Department and 
in the Pentagon are so happy to work with the EU. And the reason is not necessarily because 
of what is practical but it has rather more to do with a broader problem in the EU–NATO 
relationships, more particularly between Paris and Washington. I have heard proposals from 
Jose Maria Aznar, former Spanish PM, suggesting that we need to bring the interior ministers 
into NATO, in another words duplicating what the EU is doing but to do that in NATO, a new 
Atlantic Treaty is needed and it would probably take at least fi ve to ten years to agree on it. 
Instead of reinventing the wheel, it would make more sense to focus on EU–US cooperation, 
which is precisely what the U.S. Homeland Security Department and U.S. Department of Justice 
are doing. This is a worrying debate because the institutional disputes tend to shed more heat 
than light and will not help us in the fi ght against terrorism.
On the cooperation between the EU governments and the U.S. it has to be said that it 
is very good. For example, there is an American–French intelligence centre outside Paris, 
where intelligence on Islamists groups, in particular, is discussed. U.S. judges and FBI agents 
have been allowed to work under German jurisdiction in Germany. The problem in this case 
is rather on the public level. The rendition story for instance is very embarrassing for the 
European governments; there are many European politicians being very critical of the U.S. 
policy, disagreeing on the war on terror and then they are caught working so closely on one 
particular issue which is illegal in number of European countries. The investigations are going 
on but we have not seen any good evidence yet; the report for the Council of Europe was based 
on press reports and that is not evidence; it is up to the governments concerned to have their 
own internal investigations but the impact on the public opinion, if more revelations about 
secret prisons in Europe are found out, would be worrying. 
There is also an interesting question about the perceptions of counterterrorism laws and 
how tough they are in the U.S. and Europe. Just because the Europeans do not talk about the 
war on terror, it does not mean they don’t have tough antiterrorism laws. If you look at what 
Tony Blair was proposing last year, and he had diffi  culties with some aspects, parts of the 
proposals are tougher than the provisions of the Patriot Act; and it is not only in the United 
Kingdom. Take glorifi cation, which is a big problem debated vigorously in the UK, as an 
example; there are already very tough anti–glorifi cation laws in Germany based on historical 
experience but, for example, the groups like Hiz–bu–Tahrir, one of the main Islamist thinking 
groups in Europe and around the world, is banned in Germany whilst it is active in the UK. 
Another example of tough laws is detention. Detention has been an extremely controversial 
issue in the British debate; the fi nal compromise is 28 days at the moment. I asked one of 
the top counterterrorism judges in France, Jean–Louis Bruguière who is famous for catching 
Carlos the Jackal, what he made of this British detention debate and he just started laughing. 
He said: “Honestly, if I want to keep somebody locked up for two years that is not a problem, 
you guys listen to your Parliament too much and that is the problem.” Take another example; 
in France, wiretap evidence can easily be used in cases, in the UK it can’t. The debate on the 
war on terror was very much focused on foreign policy, defence policy and the use of force; 
looking at the legislation, the view that the Europeans are quite soft and the Americans quite 
hard in counterterrorism, is reversed. 
As to the public opinion, John Glenn has already mentioned the Transatlantic Trends survey 
and the strong agreement across the Atlantic on the nature of the threat and its importance in 
general. However, within Europe, there are big diff erences and the split runs clearly between 
East and West. In Western Europe, the average percentage of those who think terrorism is 
the most important security issue varies between 20–40 %; in the Eastern Europe and further 
East you go, it starts falling rapidly, in Slovenia and Slovakia is less than 1 %. This feeds into 
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a perception generally shared in Brussels that Central and Eastern European governments 
don’t feel as if they are in the line of fi re the way the Western European governments are. That 
perception may be unfair, partly caused by the fact there are no large Muslim populations in 
these countries but it is a perception and it is something that should bother us. A far more 
worrying are the polls of European Muslims; over the last year since the July 7 (2005) bombings, 
I have looked at a number of polls of the Muslim community and on average, roughly 20 % 
tend to have some sympathy with the London bombers; that is worrying because of com-
parisons with the situation in the Northern Ireland, where one of the main reasons why the 
IRA lasted as long as it did, was its consistent 30 % of national population support. Terrorists 
need support, not just logistics or money, it is what given them sustenance. Again, the EU is 
probably not the place to discuss formulating a policy on it; rather it can act like a think–tank 
for experience exchange. 
My fi nal point is about the language of counterterrorism. It is fair to say that there are not 
many people in Europe who like the phrase “war on terror”; Europeans keep talking about 
the “fi ght against terrorism”. If the Europeans hear the phrase, they think it is militaristic, 
short-term and that it legitimizes terrorists because it implies that they are warriors, not 
criminals; the Europeans also don’t think such a phrase is going to win hearts and minds 
and ultimately for Europeans, you have to win hearts and minds. However, this criticism is 
not entirely fair; the U.S. approach to the “war on terror” is much more sophisticated than it 
is given credit for, looking at what the U.S. is trying to do in terms of democracy promotion, 
for instance. Indeed, the Pentagon generals wanted the phrase changed but the President 
Bush had to keep it because the Republicans in Congress did not want to abandon it. The 
Pentagon and the State Department are not thinking in these terms, but it is the part of the 
American debate; it is like the “war on drugs” or the “war on poverty”; it is full of action – pro-
claiming that we are doing something about it. To European ears, however, it sounds very 
dangerous and there are good reasons for this; it is partly because there are large Muslim 
populations in Western Europe and there are worries about home-grown terrorism; it is also 
partly because of the European experience of counterterrorism, which has taught European 
countries that ultimately, terrorism must be treated as a crime using the police and judiciary. 
Also President Bush is not a very popular man in most of Europe and nearly anything he says 
will be disregarded, and that is a shame.
Looking at transatlantic cooperation, it needs to be borne in mind that when Europeans 
think about terrorism, they see it as an internal threat; when Americans think about terrorism, 
they see it as an external threat – 9/11 was caused by people who came from somewhere 
else – going to the root of that problem, to the Middle East, is the solution. For Europeans, 
thinking about London, the perpetrators came from the North of England, from Yorkshire, 
not from Islamabad or Yemen and that is something we have to discuss and be more honest 
with each other about.
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I will make three main points, which have already been tackled in part. First, I propose 
to reassess our threat perception, secondly, to list what has been achieved – the good 
news so to say and thirdly, to list the bad news – what is still lacking and what still needs 
to be done in the transatlantic realm.
To start with the risk assessment, I would particularly question parts of the U.S. 
government threat assessment. If you go fi ve years back in your mind and ask what 
the fi rst reaction to 9/11 was, usually the fi rst visceral response was that, from now 
on, this kind of attack was going to happen again because, apparently, it is so simple 
to attack highly-developed states like the U.S. For example, something like stealing 
a plane and attacking the Reichstag in Berlin appeared to be comparably easy. All 
catastrophic scenarios ranging from radiological attack, the release of biological agents 
and contamination of the water supply of the major cities seemed possible; in such 
an atmosphere, a mere few grams of white powder could cause anthrax hype in the 
U.S. as well as in Europe and lead to the general perception of Jihadi terrorism as an 
overarching threat, dominating all aspects of security policy and risk assessment. In the 
U.S., in the decision making part of the government, such a perception has survived for 
fi ve years and even in Europe some still believe in the overarching threat of terrorism. 
The Bush administration has gone as far as to equate the threat of Islamist violence 
with the danger hitherto posed by the former Soviet Union. Only recently the argument 
was that the fi ght against terrorism is a new Cold War – long and dark – and that all 
energy needs to be focused on securing victory in it. However, such a world view is no 
longer convincing today, because fi ve years after the 9/11 two simple facts have to be 
taken into account. First, whether or not the campaign against terrorism is a war, and 
it is truly arguable, it is certainly not comparable to the Cold War simply because, had 
the Cold War become a hot one, the consequences would have been dramatically dif-
ferent. If a Soviet nuclear missile launch had been detected, the U.S. National Security 
Advisor would have had only about three minutes to verify the threat and on reaching 
the President afterwards, the President would have basically had about four minutes to 
decide on the response. Assuming that the president had decided to respond in kind, 
launching the U.S. nuclear missiles; the result would have been 160 million people dead 
within the next six hours. It is quite clear that even a massive terrorist attack today could 
cause only a very small proportion of these casualties. Such a body count may appear 
cynical but these facts have to be taken into account, not at least for the sake of future 
transatlantic coherence. The second point is very simple; there has been no repeat of 
9/11 in the last fi ve years. We experienced the Madrid and London bombings, certainly 
tragic events but not comparable by far to the catastrophes in New York and Washington 
D.C.; neither when looked at symbolically, nor in respect of the number of casualties or 
global repercussions of 9/11. 
However, optimistic predictions may not be in order, it is quite possible that at this 
very minute somebody is planning another 9/11 – we simply don’t know. Still, we have 
to concede that the predicted nightmare scenarios just did not happen, certainly due 
the fact that our preemptive and protective means have been increasingly successful 
but perhaps also because our initial threat perception rather overblown and pessimistic. 
Please do not get me wrong: I am not playing down the problem of international 
terrorism; Islamic violence will remain a long term key challenge for our societies, par-
ticularly since the attacks in London and other events have shown that our societies 
are apparently breeding their own new generations of Muslim zealots. The threat is 
a real one. However, my point is that Jihadi terrorism is not an existential threat for the 
transatlantic community and we should not infl ate it into a clash of cultures, which will 
threaten our civilizations. 
The exaggeration contains two pitfalls. Firstly, it contributes to the transatlantic 
divergence over threat perceptions, which in turn has detrimental consequences to 
consensual approach; much of the European-U.S. disputes we have had so far merely 
stem from the fact that our threat assessments have been diff erent. Secondly, focusing 
too much on combating terrorism, there is a danger that other security threats might 
be neglected. Wars between the major states do not belong to the past as some may 
assume; security policy is more than dealing primarily with the non–state actors. The 
basic feeling today, particularly in Western Europe, is that since we cannot be attacked, 
the non–state actors remain as the only problem. This is not the case; if the energy 
crisis becomes as grave as the present forecasts indicate, it is hard to imagine that oil 
and gas competition among the major players will always be resolved in a consensual 
way. Moreover, given the situation in Iran and North Korea, the signifi cant increase in 
the number of nuclear states is likely to lead to signifi cant regional power structure 
changes. The countries which now have or are likely to have the WMD are those which 
will be aff ected most by the global warming and rising sea levels in the future. A British 
analyst stated recently that we might regard the year 2006 as the golden age of the 
century in 50 or 100 years time from now. If we focus exclusively on counterterrorism, 
taking previous crises as the models for the future, there is a very real danger that we 
might be completely surprised again and the negative impact of such a miscalculation 
on the transatlantic relations is quite clear. 
Taking a more optimistic view of the challenges, whilst not underestimating the threat 
of terrorism, leads to a rather diff erent assessment of the good news and the bad news. 
Five years after 9/11, the balance sheet does not actually look that bad. The good news 
is that transatlantic cooperation on combating terrorism has improved signifi cantly. This 
holds true not only for the multinational organizations like NATO, G8 or the EU but also 
for the “bilateral” EU–U.S. level. NATO, for example, whilst certainly not having a “silver 
bullet” that would lay terrorism to rest once and for all, has agreed several NATO summit 
communiqués on terrorism, which, regardless their actual eff ect, are strong evidence of 
this. Very importantly, NATO also agreed not to exclude the preemptive use of military 
force against terrorism; a document has been signed by all NATO countries, confi rming 
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this. Whether or not NATO will be able to put this statement into eff ect, the important point 
is that something which was so controversial in the transatlantic debate, did not actually 
prevent NATO from reaching a consensus; all NATO members signed, even the German 
and French governments, showing that it is possible to fi nd consensus on controversial 
solutions if they relate to issues like terrorism.
The G8 has become the key institution in implementing data and biometrical infor-
mation exchange; the EU has also developed some measures, which have already been 
mentioned. As a result, we are currently doing much better in antiterrorism operations 
than fi ve years ago, both on the national level as well as in respect of the transatlantic 
dimension. British success only a couple of weeks ago in disrupting a major terrorist plot 
was no accident. It is also worth noting that the trade-off  between providing security 
from terrorism on the one hand and restricting civil liberties on the other seems to be 
more a problem of elites, which does not have such an impact on average people. In 
relation to the Transatlantic Trends survey which has just been mentioned, if 70 % or 
80 % of Germans and Americans have no problem with wiretapping, then that becomes 
essentially a problem for the elites who are complaining about it. 
However, one has to remain realistic concerning what can be achieved in the EU and 
on the transatlantic level. We should not be over-ambitious; the EU approach is still 
a national one, the EU–wide approach is still not operational for the variety of reasons, 
not least because the EU is going through a bad period at the moment. There are some 
limits: transatlantic cooperation has its natural limits due to the different legal tradi-
tions, history or positions on very concrete issues, such as the use of the death penalty. 
It is clear that we have different strategic cultures on the both sides of the Atlantic, 
and that this imposes limits on cooperation. The same holds true for intelligence 
sharing: intelligence sharing has its limits primarily because intelligence services do 
not want to share. Furthermore, the readiness of some countries, particularly in the 
EU, to accept the transatlantic cooperation is limited; EU–NATO cooperation does not 
work because some NATO countries do not want it to function. France, for example, 
does not want close cooperation between NATO and EU for a variety of reasons, with 
the result that France blocks everything whether the other members like it or not. 
So it is important to be careful not to raise unrealistic expectations on the level of 
transatlantic or EU cooperation.
Finally, there is the bad news; after fi ve years, the report card on terrorism contains, 
in my view at least, four points, which qualifi es as a D grade. Firstly, we have not fully 
recovered yet from the severe transatlantic crisis over Iraq. Signifi cant political improve-
ments have certainly taken place; at last some in Washington have understood that the 
fi ght against terrorism and unilateralism are mutually exclusive. It has become quite 
clear that even a country like the U.S., enjoying unique military power and political 
might, needs allies and international support for the various aspects of its anti-terrorist 
actions. Europe has realized the need for transatlantic cooperation as well; we are 
currently experiencing a surprising consensus on Iran, for instance. Furthermore; there 
were some political developments like the partial regime change in Germany, which 
has made the things easier, too. At the same time, the international image of the U.S. 
has deteriorated signifi cantly; Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have severely dam-
aged America’s morale authority and leadership skills. The Iraq disaster has improperly 
blurred the lines between anti-terrorism and proliferation and has established some 
confusing terms like “state-terrorism”. I say this as personally someone who supported 
the military action against Saddam Hussein and I am perhaps one of the few who still 
recall doing so.
Secondly, some European countries are still inward looking when it comes to the 
international dimension of anti-terrorist operations. I found it interesting that the 
Transatlantic Trends poll indicated a high level of transatlantic risk awareness; the 
fi gures of 79 % of the Americans and 66 % of Europeans who regard the threat posed 
by terrorism as extremely important were quoted. Perhaps the situation in Germany 
is particularly diff erent but there is a poll done by the Institute for Social Sciences of 
the German Armed Forces saying that two-thirds of Germans feel more threatened 
by the cuts in social expenditure than by terrorism. It is something which fl uctuates, 
for example, under the infl uence of major sporting events such as the soccer world 
championship. However, but by and large, many Europeans societies are quite inward 
looking, and that poses a problem.
The third shortcoming, closely intertwined with the trend to inwardness, is the lack of 
explanations and coherent justifi cations of political decisions to the public, particularly 
where controversial actions are contemplated against terrorism such as military action. 
This holds true for the transatlantic level; the U.S. failed to explain coherently to its allies 
why it was necessary to act militarily against Saddam Hussein; it is simply not enough to 
make statements about an axis of evil and hope that this is self-justifying. This also holds 
true for the European national level, where many national governments have so far failed 
to explain the necessity of international engagements, particularly if they involve casual-
ties. For instance, what is at stake in Afghanistan has not been explained properly – it is 
still unclear to many whether it is about combating terrorism, reconstruction, stabilization 
or whether it is an anti–drug operation. The more body bags start returning, the more 
public support for Afghanistan is certain to decline further. 
This leads to the fourth shortcoming, and this is the inadequate allocation of the 
resources, notable on the European side. Much has not taken place on the European 
level simply because resources have not been allocated in an appropriate way. I am 
not talking primarily about the defence budget; the defence budget certainly is impor-
tant – particularly when the NATO Secretary General has to go begging for a couple 
of helicopters to get things done in Afghanistan, something which I personally feel is 
a great shame – however, my point is rather diff erent. In Germany in 1990, 21.5 % of the 
total federal budget was spent on foreign policy expenditure, which includes the budget 
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of three foreign-policy ministries – the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Aff airs 
and the Ministry for Development Aid. In 2005, the fi gure has almost halved to 12 %. At 
a time when the international weight of Germany, as well as of many other European 
countries, has increased signifi cantly and when terrorism is one of the key challenges 
facing us, our foreign policy expenditure has halved; and this includes not only money 
for military actions but for international activities in general. I understand the political 
diffi  culties connected with shifting the priority from domestic, and especially social 
spending, to foreign policy expenditure; however, if we don’t fi nd a politically acceptable 
way of doing this, we might end up learning our lessons the hard way. 
To conclude on a positive note, there is ample room for improvement on the both sides 
of the Atlantic, but it is fair to say that the transatlantic alliance is certainly healthier than 
it was fi ve years ago. There is no reason for complacency but there is also no reason for 
alarming assessments, which in the end I would argue tend to do more harm than good.
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■   NATO and its summit in Riga (November 2006) – designing new agenda? Elaboration 
of NATO duplicating the eff orts of the EU; is NATO a framework for the military aspect of 
counterterrorism? 
■   Threat perception –not only the importance of the threat but also its likelihood; the impact 
of the thwarted attacks on the threat perception in Germany.
■   Is democracy a panacea to all major problems, including terrorism; can democracy be 
promoted from the outside? Both democracies and non–democracies are breeding terror 
and are targets of if. 
■   State terrorism – a defi nition
■   International norms and rules have to be observed, that is defi nition of a civilized inter-
national society, the U.S. administration violates not only the law but also the principles 
of the UN charter;
■   International law versus legitimacy, international law has problems of being out of date, 
it is necessary to diff erentiate between legal and legitimate operations. 
■   Intervention by Mr. Reuven Paz: When we talk about Jihadi terrorism, we are talking 
mainly about the Arab threat because all the new ideology, interpretations and doctrines 
of modern Jihad which originated in the Arab world and have been exported. We have 
to understand that there is a lot in its roots that in fact does not concern Europe, the U.S. 
or any other country in the world besides the Arab governments and societies. This is not 
a clash of civilizations; fi rst and foremost, it is a clash within the Arab world and, secondly, 
within the Islamic world. We are also talking about groups that have experienced great 
success with the use of internet; the internet allows the creation of a new platform for 
nationalism, based on the solidarity between the entire Muslim world – such a solidarity 
can be created by intensive indoctrination accessible in seconds to the millions. The main 
issue is also that the populations of Muslim countries are not sitting and waiting for 
democracy, they are not looking for parliamentary elections. There was a success in 
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1990 in Algeria with the fi rst democratic elections ever held in the Arab world and what 
happened? – they were impeached and arrested with the support of France and the U.S. It 
almost happened in Jordan in 1993, it could have happened in Egypt in December 2005, 
it happened in Palestinian Authority in January 2006. The Shias in Iraq were not waiting 
for democracy brought to them by the U.S.; they wanted to become the majority through 
the elections. The democracy imported by the U.S. to Iraq fuelled the ethnical, national 
and religious fi ght between Shias and Sunnis; that is the clash between communities. The 
form of Western democracy is premature for the Arabs and for many parts of the Muslim 
world and perhaps the U.S. and Europe should look for another form of how to encourage 
local groups to have for example more freedom of speech but not necessarily to bring the 
whole concept of democracy. Also in the past year or two, there has been a growing sense, 
even an apocalyptic sense within the Muslim communities in Europe that they are moving 
inexorably towards a clash with the majority society – the riots in France, the cartoons in 
Denmark, the statement by Pope – this has added to the sense of the inevitability of such 
a clash. In this context, we are witnessing not only home-grown terrorism in Europe but 
also what I would call the “Jihad seekers”; people who are actively going either to join 
terrorist groups or looking for a way how to carry out terrorism, inspired by global Jihadi 
strategy, but organised by themselves. Besides the sense of apocalypse, it is also a result of 
growing alienation from the societies they are living in. By the way, we are not seeing the 
same phenomenon among the 7 millions Muslims in the United States. Europe is gradually 
becoming the unique arena for the coming clash. 
Daniel Keohane:
The main role of NATO as a military alliance is to try to coordinate some of the defence 
elements of counterterrorism. It is already working hard on how armed forces can work 
together in the emergency response fi eld; it is already active with some maritime surveil-
lance operations of the East of Africa; that is ongoing. There are lots of complementarities 
between what the EU and NATO do but there is no recognition of that because they do 
not talk to each other. For example on the emergency response, I spoke with an offi  cial 
from the EU Situation Centre (SitCen) and I asked whether they talk to NATO about the 
emergency response and whether they discuss any coordination; and he replied they did 
not. It did not even occur to them. This is the problem you have in Brussels at the moment; 
the two organizations are not even talking to each other. 
Afghanistan is also crucial in all of this; it will cast a fairly long shadow over the Riga 
summit. If you look at the agenda for Riga, most of it is already ongoing; it is about military 
transformation, emergency response or enlargement but nobody really want to discuss the 
controversial issues. I expect it to be a boring summit. Indeed, the best the governments 
have declared is that we need a new strategic concept but we don’t want to talk about 
it right now, we can perhaps start the process by bringing in some wise men; it sounds 
as if, when in doubt, set up a committee. We need a bit more honest debate on it across 
the Atlantic.
Another comment on the evolving strategic agenda; NATO has gone through a huge 
process of change over the last fi fteen years. It has gone global, it is not out of business; and 
in fact, it has never been busier. Look at Afghanistan, at the emergency response in Pakistan, 
at training Iraqi forces, at helping EU in Bosnia and at its presence in Kosovo – there are all 
sorts of things NATO is doing and there is a discussion on how NATO can work better with 
the non–NATO countries like Australia or Japan. The problem is that counterterrorism does 
not fi t very neatly in that strategic agenda because it is still very military-focused. Even 
counterterrorism operations (let’s say for example trying to fi nd warlords in Somalia) are not 
going to be done though NATO; Pentagon and the key European governments are doing it 
with each other; like the small operation in Djibouti – there are French, British, American 
and German soldiers but it is not a NATO operation. That is really the problem. 
The European experience of counterterrorism, particularly with ETA and the IRA teaches 
us that standing up for democracy, human rights and rule of law and trying to encourage 
that space is the right way forward. It does not mean that the Irish and Spanish models will 
work everywhere; it does not work for example with the Red Brigades because that is not 
what they are looking for and it certainly would not work with Al Qaeda; but that is the 
general approach. When we talk about Islamist terrorism, there are many diff erent types 
and groups, some are local some are home grown, some are Al Qaeda linked, and others 
are not. When we talk about Hamas and Hezbollah, there is a case for trying to promote 
democracy and rule of law. When we talk about Iraq, it is entirely diff erent question. The 
problem is not about promoting democracy but how to do it, and it obviously cannot be 
done with the military force. It raises a set of other issues but perhaps more important point 
is that even if democracy promotion helps with countering terrorism, it is actually not the 
reason why it should be done. Democracy promotion is frankly a good idea; the question 
is how to encourage it from within – be it in Iran, standing up for independent judiciary 
in Algeria, be it encouraging more democracy in Syria. That is something we should be 
aware of; a lot of counterterrorism experts loose sight of that and they are guilty of seeing 
democracy as a panacea. 
Couple of comments on the very interesting intervention made by Mr. Paz; let me just 
clarify what I understand to be the threat from Islamist terrorism. We basically face three 
circles of threat; obviously there is Al Qaeda, which many analysts argue is practically 
dismantled, although it is open for debate whether there is eff ectively a post-Al Qaeda 
phase. There are local groups like Hamas, some of whom have or had links with Al Qaeda, 
some of them don’t; the question is, can we ensure these local groups don’t go global? 
A third group, which are the most dangerous to the Europeans, are the Al Qaeda inspired, 
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particularly home-grown terrorists. It is right to point out the origins of Islamist terrorism 
and we in the West should not forget that most of the terrorist attacks are carried out in the 
Muslim countries. This suggests most of the grievances are local. The problem is whether 
there is a chance of glue that might unite all these groups or not; because a number of 
Westerners and indeed the Western politicians tend to lump all these groups together, 
whether they be Sunni or Shia. I refer to some of the comments that came out of the U.S. 
administration during the summer over the developments in Lebanon; the failure of our 
analysis in the West is that we tend to lump the nationalists groups together. 
Final minor point, it is right to focus on Arab terrorism on one level, the problem is that 
for Europeans it has moved beyond that; it is about Bosnia, Chechnya; it is also about the 
links with countries like Pakistan. That is while it is useful to look at the source; but we 
also have to look beyond it. 
Karl–Heinz Kamp:
On the subject of the NATO summit, not only will it be boring but also rather short; Tony 
Blair is only staying shortly, Ms. Merkel has to rush quickly back to a party convention. The 
reasons for this are basically twofold; fi rst, the summit was scheduled before the agenda 
was set. Secondly, two summits were scheduled at the same time – one in 2006 and 
the other in 2008, and when you are presented with the choice between a task and two 
deadlines, which one would you take? It should be a transformation summit but it will be 
rather a postponement summit.
In relation to the threat perception; it is indeed going to change in Germany but 
very slowly. There was a double illusion in Germany for many years. First, Germany has no 
international interests, that is something characteristic to the U.S. but Germany is basically 
a national entity and it does not have anything to do with what is going on abroad. It is 
patently wrong; we have the same interests in the international developments as other 
countries. The second illusion was that Germany, as long as it remains more or less inactive, 
rather an observer of the international politics, will be safe, because only those who 
get engaged become a target. That view was slightly scratched when the fi rst target of 
a terrorist attack in Iraq was the UN headquarters in Baghdad, but with the Spanish and 
the UK bombings, the targets, which were directly involved in Iraq, the former view was 
rather confi rmed. This is going to change again in relation to the plot which was discovered 
couple of weeks ago. Actually, the soccer championship also changed a lot because some 
of the people caught in the plot said they originally planned to detonate the bombs, 
when the soccer championship was taking place; people realized they could have been 
hit. It takes long time to get an adequate threat assessment through to the public and it 
gets another long way to translate the threat assessment into preparedness and devoting 
resources. To be able and to be willing to change priorities is a long process and apparently, 
the societies are partially doomed to follow a process of learning through their mistakes 
and the suff ering which is occasioned in the process. 
Concerning the two points on state terrorism and violations of the international 
law; of course certain forms of totalitarianism or dictatorship can be described as state 
terrorism, however, it does not help that much since no clear criteria are set. There is still 
the problem that for one group of states someone is a terrorist and for others they are 
a freedom fi ghter. Secondly, if you say that a country is not only a dictatorship but practises 
state terrorism, what diff erence does it make to your dealings with it? Are you legally 
permitted to do more in relation to such a state and who is there to defi ning it; we had 
the same problem with the term “rogue state”, which was not clearly defi ned. 
The second point is on the U.S. violating international law and the question of agreeing 
that no violation of international law and norms should occur. The question was asked rhe-
torically and I shall answer rhetorically too – no, I do not agree; my reason for this is because 
NATO violated international norms in 1999 when it launched its campaign against Serbia, 
and it was right to do so, with the support of the German, Czech and other governments. 
It is patently too easy to say we should abide by international law and everything is fi ne, it 
is not. The UN Charter was written 60 years ago and some of the problems we face today 
are not covered by the document; there is not a word on terrorism or non-state actors. 
We have to adapt international law to new conditions, however, what do you do in the 
meantime? And that was the situation in which NATO found itself in the case of Kosovo. 
Nobody seriously doubted that a humanitarian catastrophe was looming in Kosovo but for 
a variety of reasons, China and Russia would not accept the Security Council Resolution. 
Should the Kosovars seriously have been told to wait another fi ve years until the interna-
tional law could have adapted to deal with the situation they found themselves in? – No, 
and NATO violated written international law, and rightly so. Some of our old recipes do not 
work anymore and to stick to the old system simply does not help much. 
Finally, I would like to make a point on legitimate versus legal; just who is going to 
defi ne what is legitimate? Iraq is a highly controversial issue but my reason for being 
in favour of military action was not the question of nuclear material, my point was that 
Saddam Hussein violated sixteen UN Security Council resolutions. The frequent counterar-
gument is but how many resolutions were violated by Israel? The answer is: not a single 
one if it comes to the Chapter 7 resolutions (UN Charter Chapter 7 – Action with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression, ed.) you are confronted 
with a situation where someone does not care at all about UN resolutions, what should 
you do – should you add some more resolutions? From that perspective you can argue 
for military action; you don’t have to, it is controversial but it is very diffi  cult to inject new 
terms like legitimacy when it is diffi  cult to set who is going to defi ne it and what happens, 
if something is not regarded as legitimate. 
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John K. Glenn:
As to the questions on democracy and democratization, there has been a great deal 
of simplistic thinking, which has come from the current administration at times and which 
is very easy to criticise and vulnerable to criticism. The assertions that either “terrorism is 
caused by anti-democratic countries” or that “democracy alone will solve the problem of 
terrorism” are obviously not true. I feel that, when you ask the question: Can democracy 
be promoted from the outside? You have to separate the idea that you can somehow 
“cause” democracy from the idea that you can encourage or promote it. I do not want to 
get too deep into the semantics here, separating out the diff erences between defi nitions 
of words too much, but, in my research on Central Europe, the question is, what role did 
the external world play? It must be said that, on the one hand, there were important roles 
played by the changes in the Soviet Union and the United States and, on the other, that 
the realities of what happened here, as well as in the other countries of the region, were 
always the results of the eff orts by local actors. So there is a positive encouraging role for 
the outsiders, particularly in a situation when the local circumstances are resource-poor. 
There is a long tradition of diff erent actors like the foundations of political parties in 
Germany seeking to encourage “reform” rather than “democracy” because democracy is 
such a big word and concept. 
As to the issue of Muslim communities in Europe versus the United States; it is easy to 
speak simplistically about this, but the question usually has to do with diff erences in views 
of integration in Europe and in the U.S., where we often say that Muslims can be Americans. 
The challenge in Europe is that it is still a leap to be made in many cases. 
The last is the issue of elections and democracy and the potential for elections to 
make violence worse in multi-ethnic societies. The role that elections can play at certain 
moments to legitimize ethnic divisions should come as no surprise to anyone here, given 
the proximity of the Balkans. Without going to the greater detail, one of the greatest 
arguments for democracy globally is that democracies don’t go to war with each other 
and this is true; the problem is that we also know that the countries that are democratizing 
are more prone to violence. It is the question of managing democratization as a process 
rather than seeing a democracy as an outcome. The timing, when you have a situation 
that is ripe for elections, is obviously paramount and we saw that issue in Bosnia time 
and time again, the fear that early elections would merely legitimize the break up of 
the state. The discussion on Iraq is another case in which you have historical grievances, 
a majority population that has been ruled by a minority, so that any simple demographic 
representation through elections would exacerbate grievances of another sort. This is one 
of the fundamental challenges of managing transitions. 
Questions / Comments and Answers
THE NEW AGE HYDRA  INDIA’S 
EXPERIENCES WITH TERRORISM 
AND COUNTERTERRORISM
Swati Parashar
Short profi le: 
Swati Parashar has been a research scholar at the University of Lancaster (UK) since October 
2006. Prior to this, she was a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Vio-
lence and Terrorism Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore. 
Before joining IDSS she was an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New 
Delhi, where she coordinated the International Terrorism Watch Programme (2003–2005). 
She was a Fulbright Fellow at the Institute of Global Confl ict and Cooperation, University of 
California, San Diego in 2006. She holds an M.A. in International Relations from Jawaharlal 
Nehru University, New Delhi and a B.A. (Honours) in History from Lady Shri Ram College, 
University of Delhi. Her publications include: Terrorism in South East Asia–Implications for 
South Asia (co-edited with Wilson John, Pearson Education, New Delhi, 2005), The US and 
South Asia: From Tactical Security Relationship towards a Strategic Partnership, (http://
www.saag.org/ %5Cpapers20 %5Cpaper1924.html) or Bangladesh: The Quagmire of 
Confl icting Nationalisms, IDSS Commentary (http://www.ntu.edu.sg/IDSS/publications/
Perspective/IDSS0302006.pdf)
Swati Parashar  The New Age Hydra – India’s Experiences with Terrorism and Counterterrorism 
Introduction
India’s experiences with terrorism, insurgency and violence date back to 1947, when the 
nation as a distinct political, national and geographic entity was realized. Ironically, after 
being home to a non–violent resistance against the British colonial rule, the new nation 
woke up to its ‘tryst with destiny’1 amidst unprecedented violence and terror resulting 
out of the partition of the country on religious grounds. Worse still, Mahatma Gandhi, the 
greatest apostle of peace and non–violence who had led the Indian struggle for freedom, 
was a victim of brutal political assassination carried out by a religious fanatic! Terror as 
strategy to settle political scores and achieve religious and political ends is therefore, not 
new in the Indian context.
The Post 9/11 emphasis on terrorism and the various counter measures and responses 
has done considerable damage to the debate on issues of human security that had started 
to emerge in the third world. State centric security discourse has regained prominence and 
non–state actors have been reduced to undesirable elements like criminals and terrorist 
groups whose aim is to destroy the peace in the world. This worldview has had an impact 
on India as well. Attempts to understand the root causes and the logic of terrorism and 
insurgency have been pushed into the background.
However, at the larger policy level, India recognizes that the ‘global war on terror’ is not 
universal in terms of content, issues and responses. This implies that India’s problems of 
terrorism have local and regional root causes and the responses would have to be through 
national resources and mostly through bilateral cooperation. This explains India’s attempts 
to work closely with governments in South Asia and most recently even with Pakistan to 
deal with the menace of terrorism and political violence. There is also an understanding 
that terrorism is just a strategy or even tactics at times employed by groups seeking an 
advantage or claim over the state. The “ism’ attached to terror is a misnomer because 
terrorism is not an end in itself nor a set of ideas or belief system on its own. It is in most 
cases a means to an end, which can range from political ideology, to anarchism, nihilism 
and religious fanaticism.
South Asia
India’s experiences with terrorism and counter terrorism would have to be located 
within an understanding of South Asia as a powerful regional entity. South Asia is strategi-
cally located as a buff er region between West and Southeast Asia, which in turn are very 
volatile regions of terror. The presence of two rival nuclear powers in this region enhances 
the threat that terrorism could lead to armed intervention and a nuclear war. This region 
1)  On the eve of independence in 1947, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made the famous speech about India’s ‘tryst with destiny’, which he said 
was realized as India achieved freedom from colonial rule.
is plagued mainly by Islamist terrorism and left-wing extremism. Ethnic violence in Sri 
Lanka perpetrated by the LTTE is also a major concern for those studying to understand 
terrorism in the world today. About 28 % of the world population of Muslims resides in 
the region that includes some of the largest Muslim countries. Interestingly, both radical 
(Deobandi) and benign (Sufi ) Islam have coexisted in this region. In a diverse region such 
as this therefore, it is important to note that domestic and not foreign policy drives both 
intra and inter–state terrorism. 
India is the largest country in South Asia and a rising global power. The Bush Administra-
tion realized the importance of the fast growing economic and political status of India and 
signed the nuclear deal for civilian nuclear cooperation in July 2005. While the “global war 
on terror” is targeted against Islamist terrorism, India’s major threat is from the left-wing 
political extremists called the Naxalites2 and nearly 15 out of the 29 federal states are 
aff ected by the Naxalite insurgency. It is therefore pertinent to understand the similarities 
and diff erences between Naxalism or left-wing extremism and Islamist Jihadi terrorism in 
Kashmir and other parts of India.
Certain similarities are obvious between the religious terrorists and the Left-wing extremists:
■  Both are based on strong perceptions of “victimhood”, exploitation and persecution. If 
Al Qaeda is waging a war against American hegemony and Western imperialist forces 
and against the forces of globalisation, so is the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), the 
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and People War (PW) in India, and other radical left 
groups. Anti-western, anti-imperialist rhetoric is a part of both religious and left-wing 
terrorism. 
■  In both cases the existing state structures are the vanguard of imperialist forces and 
must be done away with. They should be replaced by new structures. Al Qaeda thinks 
that governments in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen and other Islamic 
countries have failed to protect the interests of the people and failed to serve the cause 
of Islam and must be overthrown by violent structures. The MCC and the PWG in India 
and the CPN (M) have also identifi ed the state as their primary enemy.
■  Both these kinds of terrorism need charismatic leaders for their mass appeal.
■  Both are waging individual wars in diff erent countries but in the hope and belief that it 
is a part of the larger religious struggle (pan–Islamism) or world proletarian revolution. 
Negotiations for immediate political solutions may suff er a setback because of the larger 
global aims and objectives of the terrorists.
■  Both have very strict codes of conduct and promise a better life to individuals for 
attracting people in large numbers. Both types of terrorism are also backed by strong 
economic and business interests.
2) Derived from Naxalbari, a village in West Bengal, India, where this movement began in the 1960´s.
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■   Both believe that violence is the only way to bring in the new socio- political, economic 
and religious order. And both are waging an unconventional form of armed confl ict 
unlike between large standing armies.
■   Both types of terrorism can become state terrorism if the state adopts these ideologies.
■   Both types of terrorism privilege the group over the individual.
■   Both types of terrorism can be linked to other transnational crimes if one examines the 
political economy of terror. Narco–traffi  cking, money laundering and small weapons 
traffi  cking are a part of both left-wing and religious terrorism.
However, with all these similarities there are glaring diff erences between the two types 
of violent ideologies which the states must take into account while formulating anti–ter-
rorism policies.
■   One derives legitimacy from religion while the other derives legitimacy from a political 
ideology that is averse to religion. 
■   Left-wing ideological terrorism is a class war between the privileged and those who 
feel deprived. Religious terrorism, on the other hand, has a very broad constituency 
of followers and believers. It includes the proletariat who participate in the religious 
struggle for a better life and the bourgeoisie who provide the material resources to fi ght 
this ideological battle. Islam for instance has appealed to all classes and protects their 
interests. It promises a better life to the poor masses and on the other hand protects 
the interests of the capitalist class by acting as a bulwark against a revolution from the 
oppressed classes. Religion creates a homogeneous category that papers over all other 
kinds of class diff erences.3
■   In the case of left-wing violence, the enemy or the ‘other’ is the state and therefore the 
constituency of attack is much smaller. In the case of religious terrorism, the constitu-
ency is much wider because the ‘other’ or the enemy is all other religions and people.
■   Far removed from ideas of religious rebirth and divine justice in heaven and hell, the 
Maoists and Naxals promise better life in this birth, through better political, economic and 
social conditions. The religious terrorists on the other hand rely extensively on promises 
of a better life after death. This is obvious in the indoctrination of Islamic suicide bombers 
who are promised a better life in the “jannat” (heaven) and 72 virgins. Suicide bombing 
for Islamic radicals is an end in itself due to the religious glory attached to it. It is the 
ultimate form of service to the brethren and submission to the divine power. The cult of 
martyrdom therefore is much stronger in religious terrorism.
■   In the case of religious terrorism there is a complete ideological domination which 
does not allow for any other political space. All other movements and kinds of power 
struggle are completely dominated by the ideological control. For example, women’s 
3)  Chris Harman has discussed this aspect of class relations in religious terrorism in his article “The prophet and the Proletariat – Islam, Religion and 
Ideology”. This is available at: http://www.marxists.de/religion/harman/. In this article Harman mentions Islam’s relations with the capitalist 
countries like Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan and Iran and its appeal to the masses.
rights or other kinds of group rights do not fi nd their rightful space and voice. Left-wing 
ideological terrorism, on the other hand, is based on socio- political and economic 
aspirations of the people. Some of the left-wing terrorist groups have taken up issues 
of exploitation of women and other under privileged sections of the society. 
■   There are more easily identifi able “root causes” in the case of left-wing violence. In the 
case of religious terrorism the material causes are far less defi ned.
■   In case of religious terrorism use of violence is often indiscriminate and to call attention. 
The purpose is to modify the behaviour of those who are not the immediate victims of 
the attack.4 By bombing Jews in a Synagogue or Muslims in a Mosque or foreigners in 
embassies the idea is to get the message across to the governments and the world at 
large. In case of left-wing terrorists the targets are often police personnel or government 
offi  cials who are directly identifi ed with the exploitative and oppressive regimes. Even 
though there are ample examples of massacres of civilians to teach a lesson to the state.
■   The two types of terrorism also diff er in their violent tactics. The religious terrorists use 
indiscriminate violence with the help of modern weapons and technology. They attack 
unarmed civilians and not armed opponents for the shock value. Some of them even 
aspire to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The left-wing terrorists organise 
themselves into guerrilla fi ghters with bases in inaccessible locations. Geography 
therefore plays a very important role in left-wing violence which is diffi  cult to control 
in inhospitable terrains. They conduct small scale hit and run operations against vulner-
able outposts of state authority such as local government buildings or small police or 
military detachments and subsequently retreat in the wake of the counter–attacks 
from the state.
■   Liberating territories from government control and in the process forming alternative 
source of political authority is an important part of the Maoist strategy. Territory is 
not a major concern for the religious terrorists. The boundaries are not well defi ned 
even by radical Islamists who proclaim the creation of a worldwide Islamic State. In 
fact some political confl icts over land resources and territory are also appropriated 
by religious terrorists if the dominant groups belong to distinct religious identities. 
The Israel–Palestine confl ict started as a confl ict for territory and illegal occupation 
considering that the Muslims and Jews have had relatively more peaceful relations in 
history till the decline of the Ottoman Empire. The confl ict today has been hijacked by 
religious forces on both sides who have now constructed the “other” on the basis of 
religion. The Jews and the Arabs have developed a very strong hatred for each other 
which goes beyond the political origins of the confl ict. The same is also true of the 
Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Certain Islamic and right wing Hindu groups 
project it a religious confl ict which actually has political issues involved.
4)  (Weinberg, Leonard, Davis, Paul, Political Terrorism, McGraw Hill Publishing Company, US, 1989)
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Terrorism and Political Violence in India
Sikh Terrorism
Sikhs living in the state of Punjab in India as well as in the UK, former West Germany, 
Canada and the US sought the means of terror emulating the Palestine Liberation Organi-
sation (PLO) in order to pressurise the Government of India to concede their demand for 
an independent State for the Sikhs to be called Khalistan. This movement for Khalistan 
started in the early 1980´s. The Khalistani terrorist organisations were largely funded by 
some members of the Sikh diaspora abroad and by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of 
Pakistan. They were trained and armed by the ISI in camps in Pakistani territory.
According to terrorism expert B. Raman, the Khalistani terrorists used four modus 
operandi; fi rst, use of hand–held weapons against selected leaders, offi  cials and others 
perceived as enemies of the Sikh religion; second, hijacking of planes of the Indian Airlines; 
they hijacked fi ve planes between 1981 and 1984; third, blowing up planes of Air India in 
mid–air, they blew up off  the Irish coast a plane originating from Toronto in June, 1985, 
killing over 200 passengers and unsuccessfully tried to blow up another plane originat-
ing from Tokyo the same day; and four, indiscriminate planting of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) in public places killing a large number of innocent civilians.5
The Indian state extensively applied a military and police approach along with 
eff orts by the Media and the society and the Sikh community in particular to counter 
terrorism. The leadership in the counter terrorism community was also derived from the 
Sikh community, a strategic move by the state to gain support and legitimacy for its 
eff orts among the people.6 The inherent nature of the Khalistan Movement prevented 
its ideology gaining ground; the “other” was not a strong category; recruitment was 
aff ected and the degeneration of the movement into petty crime hastened its demise 
by the late 1980´s.
Naxalites
The Indian Prime Minister had in early 2005, stated that Naxalites are the biggest threat 
to India’s national security in the present context. His statement came before the Mumbai 
train blasts of July 2006, carried out by Islamist elements, but the Naxalite insurgency still 
poses a serious challenge to the state. From 55 districts in nine states, the Naxalite or the 
Maoist rebels have spread their network to about 200 districts in 15 states.
5)  Refer to Evolution of India’s Counter-Terrorism Capabilities, International Terrorism Monitor paper no. 55 by B. Raman, 
http://www.saag.org/ %5Cpapers18 %5Cpaper1793.html
6)  The Punjab anti–terrorism campaign was led by a Sikh offi  cer, the Director General of Police, Mr. KPS Gill.
Extortions, kidnapping and loot are their usual means of generating revenue for their 
activities. CPML–PW and MCC–I7, the two Maoist rebel parties merged into a single entity 
called Communist Party of India–Maoist in 2004. Since then violence has been on the rise.
A breathing space for Naxal violence has been created because of the preoccupation 
with religious terrorism since 9/11. However, unless the extent of the Naxal menace is 
recognised and proportionate responses are articulated and implemented, this problem 
is far from being rooted out.
Jihadi Terrorism: Kashmir and Beyond
Islamist terrorism emerged in the late 1980´s in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The 
terrorist groups sought to emulate the perceived “success” of the Afghan mujahideen and 
several veterans of the Afghan war returned to operate in the Kashmir valley. The Inter 
Services Intelligence of Pakistan and the Pakistani state provided logistical and monetary 
support to groups like Lashkar e Toiba (LeT), Harkat ul Mujahideen (HuM), Hizbul Muja-
hideen (HM), Harkat ul Jihad al Islami (HuJI) and the Jaish e Mohammed (JeM).
Early information about the Jihadi operations in Jammu and Kashmir came from the 
Najibullah Government in Afghanistan and even from Israel. However, the Indian state in 
the later part of the 1980´s was busy with the LTTE issue in Sri Lanka and ignored these early 
warnings. By the 1990´s the Kashmiri based Jihadi groups had begun a ruthless campaign 
against the Indian civilians and the state.
Post 9/11, these groups are now taking jihad to other parts of India – and the “other” has 
become an amorphous category. There have been attacks carried out by Islamist groups 
in all the major cities of India and on soft targets. The “fi dayeen”, or deadly variant of the 
suicide bomber in India’s context, emerged in the late 1990´s esp. after the Kargil war 
between India and Pakistan. They prefer fi ghting till the end over instant explosion – and 
consider suicide bombings unislamic. However, in recent times, even suicide bombings 
have been reported from the Kashmir valley.
Pakistan has done enough at the Western Frontier to capture Taliban and Al Qaeda 
elements but the Eastern Frontier with India remains ignored. Terrorist training camps still 
exist and their logistical infrastructure is still intact. Bangladesh has also emerged as the 
new hub of Jihadi terrorism in South Asia. In recent times terrorist groups have entered 
India from the eastern border using Bangladesh as their base. 
Local grievances of the Indian Muslim youth are continuously being exploited by Jihadi 
groups like LeT, JeM and HuM. However, Al Qaeda is still a far cry for Indian Muslims and no 
Al Qaeda presence in the Indian territories has been reported till date. There is still no trace 
of “Arabization” of terror, and madrasahs are not the sources of radicalization in India. 
7)  CPIML–PW : Communist Party of India, Marxist Leninist – Peoples War, MCC–I : Maoist Communist Centre – India
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Islamist terrorism will continue to pose a serious challenge to the state and threaten 
the secular values of the country. Communal passions if ignited due to intensifi ed Jihadi 
campaign will cause great damage to social harmony and also lead to riots and loss of lives 
and property.
Counterterrorism Experience
Terrorism in India is due to local causes and infl uences and is aided by cross border sanc-
tuaries in the neighbourhood. The counterterrorism strategies aim at survival of the Indian 
state in a very unstable region and at preserving the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the 
secular ethos of the nation.
India’s counterterrorism strategy deploys national resources through bilateral and multilat-
eral cooperation. Counter insurgency has been important aspect of internal security manage-
ment since 1947 due to the tribal and communist insurgency that hit parts of independent India. 
Counterterrorism, as a policy consideration emerged only with the advent of Sikh terrorism 
in the early 1980´s and aviation, personal and anti explosives security were introduced. 1989 
onwards, Islamist terrorism, “fi dayeen” attacks and Jihadi ideology started gaining ground. 
Maoist or naxalite violence also reached threatening forms since the late 1990´s.
Indian responses to terrorism and Maoist violence have included a multi pronged 
approach – both military and non–military through economic, social, psychological, media, 
and diplomatic initiatives. According to B. Raman, counterterrorism has four aspects:8
■   Preventive through timely intelligence
■   Physical security to counter attacks if intelligence fails
■   Crisis management post attacks
■   Deterrence through legal procedures
India lacks in comprehensive legislation against terrorism. Legal acts like TADA9 and 
POTA10 were repealed after opposition from diff erent groups. Even as this paper is written 
judicial drama over the 1993 Mumbai blasts unfolds in India with piecemeal judgments being 
accorded.11 The conviction rate is extremely low in terrorist related cases in India and criminals 
and terrorists are fi rst to declare their faith in the Indian judiciary. The judicial system has to 
8)  Refer to Evolution of India’s Counter-Terrorism Capabilities, International Terrorism Monitor paper no.55 by B. Raman, 
http://www.saag.org/ %5Cpapers18 %5Cpaper1793.html
9)  TADA: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities act, repealed in 1995, allowed Indian forces to round up and detain citizens for up to one year without 
formal charges, due process of law or formal trial. When and if court hearings were held, they were held in secret. Victims did not allowed to 
confront their accusers, and „witnesses“ kept their identities secret. 
10)  POTA: Prevention of Terrorist Activities act was an anti-terrorism legislation enacted by the Parliament of India in 2002. The legislation was introduced 
by the governing NDA coalition dominated by the Bharatiya Janata Party. The legislation followed, and is largely identical in its provisions to, the 
Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (POTO) promulgated by the same government in 2001. The act was repealed in 2004 by the UPA coalition.
11)  The 1993 Mumbai blasts verdict is being announced by the special TADA court in diff erent parts. Most people argue, “Justice delayed is justice 
denied’ in the case of the 93 blasts. The 1993 bomb blasts took 13 long years for judgment, before the ones responsible have been brought to 
task and worse still the real culprits are still at large.
be made accountable and the importance of witness protection and circumstantial evidence 
needs to emphasize in cases related to terrorism.
Even though India records the largest number of terrorist strikes and deaths due to 
terrorism in the world every year, air power or the artillery or other heavy weapons have 
not been used against the terrorists in any part of India. Disproportionate use of force and 
collateral damage will only serve to alienate the common people and antagonize them 
against the state. 
India has had a long history of counterterrorism cooperation with other countries, particularly 
with the UK, Canada and the US. This cooperation has expanded further after 9/11. Most recently 
has been the idea of an Indo–Pakistan joint anti–terrorism mechanism agreed to by the Indian 
Prime Minister and President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan during their meeting on the margins 
of the Non–Aligned Summit at Havana in September 2006. The joint statement issued at Havana 
said: “The two leaders met in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts. They strongly condemned all 
acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a scourge that needs to be eff ectively dealt with. 
They decided to put in place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to identify 
and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations.” This is a positive initiative and 
if implied seriously will strengthen the peace process between the two countries.
Conclusion
Islamist terrorism remains a major threat in India along with Naxalism. Home grown and 
“copy cat” terrorism have emerged as the new trend within Islamist terrorism since 2001, and 
jihad has reached other parts of India. Islamists targeted Ayodhya, Varanasi, Bangalore, Delhi 
and Mumbai in the last couple of years. New tactics employed by terrorists include hostage 
taking, attack on places of worship, mass killings and attacks on soft targets like shopping 
malls and commuter trains. Communal tensions and violence in India have a long history and 
have to be understood to study both the root cause and consequences of terrorism. 
Politically motivated terrorism, where political power and territorial control are the 
objectives can be addressed through political engagement with terrorist groups – Punjab and 
North East have been successes as far as the Indian experiences are concerned. The Naxals 
have also shown an interest in negotiations with the state at diff erent times and eff orts are 
on to bring back the Maoist rebels to the political mainstream.
However, religious and more specifi cally Islamist terrorism will continue to threaten India’s 
interests. How India will respond to this “New Age Hydra” – bilaterally and multilaterally, will 
also determine India’s role in the region and in the international system. The resilient Indian 
democracy and the Indian society with a rich heritage of tolerance and a history of adapting 
to the changing times will have to work together to counter terrorism, from ideological and 
recruitment levels to crisis management after an act of terror. Terrorism is not merely a law 
and order problem in India, and both the state and society will have to work together to 
respond to this menace.
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In terms of organizations or movements, there are two sources of terrorism in Turkey; 
the fi rst is ethnic and for ease of reference can be labelled “Kurdish”. The visible actor of the 
Kurdish terrorism is the PKK (Workers´ Party of Kurdistan). It is an armed organisation that 
has been staging terrorist acts especially in South East Turkey (the traditional homeland 
of the majority of the Kurds) and recently in urban centres, especially in the tourist resorts, 
in order to involve foreign governments in the confl ict. According to recent intelligence 
reports, there are about 700 PKK militia within Turkey and about 2.400 in the camps in 
North Iraq; using the porous, mountainous, border region between Iraq and Turkey, they 
move in for off ensive operations and move out in order to retreat to a safe haven.
The other source of terrorism is religious; in this respect, there are two main organiza-
tions. The fi rst is Turkish Hezbollah, which has nothing to do with the Hezbollah in Lebanon 
and is not a Shiite organisation. After the military defeat of the PKK in 1999, Hezbollah 
turned into a mafi a type of organisation, kidnapping people, practising extortion and so 
on; it moved to the urban centres, especially to Istanbul and became a menace for public 
safety. It did not take long for the government to crack down on this organization and 
now Hezbollah is reduced to a minor organisation trying to reorganise once again. It is 
a Kurdish organization, it was born in the small towns of South East Turkey and as it moved 
to the West, the system started perceiving it as a “near and present” threat and moved to 
demolish those structures which were visible at that time. 
While thinking that the worst was behind it, Turkey was shaken by two consecutive 
bomb explosions in Istanbul that took place in October 2003. All of a sudden we discovered 
that there was a new group; a Jihadi formation that was loosely associated with Al Qaeda 
but did not come from the abroad – although the indoctrination and ideology came from 
the abroad the perpetrators were home grown. They were the products of the kind of alter-
native religious training and socialization that have become aff ective in Turkey especially 
in the past two decades. This group sees itself as part of the global Jihadi network. This 
network has two major enemies; one is the “near enemy” and the other the “distant enemy”. 
The “near enemy” is made up of the Islamic societies and secular governments which do 
not share the same values and ideology with the group. The “distant enemy” consists of 
both the United States, which is associated with the idea of a modern crusade and Israel, 
termed the “Zionist infi del”. Both are considered the sworn enemies of Islam.
Sixty-nine people were detained after the bombings in Istanbul, suspected of being 
perpetrators or affi  liated supporters, when the documents from their interrogations were 
made accessible, I went through all the statements and found an unfamiliar picture. They 
were not people who had hard lives with a grievance against a system which had excluded 
and oppressed them. Most of them were high school graduates; about one-third of them 
had a university degree. Some of them were small businessmen. However, they were 
converted to an alternative creed to mainstream Islam which was wrathful and vengeful in 
comparison to it. Through an alternative, non–traditional socialization into religion inspired 
by Wahhabism and fi nanced by Saudi Arabia, a Salafi  Jihadi movement has grown up in 
Turkey, as well as other parts of the Islamic world suff ering from underdevelopment and 
an authoritarianism which suppresses individualism. These people have become alienated 
from the world they were raised in, and they already feel they belonged to another world 
that is neither national, nor home grown any more. 
As regards the information yielded by the Turkish case in dealing with terrorism, most 
of my points highlight ambiguities and what not to do. Consequently, I leave it to readers 
to draw their own conclusions on the methods of counterterrorism. Here are the basic 
problem areas:
1. Defi nition of the phenomenon of terrorism. Terrorism must not be defi ned through the 
perspective of an ideology. The grievances and demands of some of the groups resorting 
to terrorism may be quite reasonable and legitimate. What is not legitimate is the method 
they use to air their grievances and carry their demands to the attention of the public: 
namely violence. Violence reduces human life to a bloody political message and sees 
human beings as expendable in a game whose stakes are much greater than the lives of 
victims and terrorists alike. In this regard there is no problem in Turkey, the Turkish popula-
tion and also the government view terrorism as an act of terror, regardless of the rational 
behind it, which, as I have already said might in some circumstances be quite reasonable. 
In the mind of radical groups, ends (that are sanctifi ed) justify means. Thus they bypass 
moral problems and shift the blame to their victims. Even if the ideology or rationale of 
the terrorist organisation coincides with that of the state or the ruling group, they must 
never be allowed to get away with this disappearing through a kind of moral “trap door”, 
thereby escaping the full moral consequences of their actions. We must always be aware 
that behind many of the violent acts, there is a social confl ict, which the government fails 
to understand or to identify and the sources of the grievances are often overlooked. 
2. There is a danger of the men with the weapons being lumped together with the wider 
groups of supporters and sympathizers. These may be made up of hundred or thousand or 
even millions of people. They extend out from the terrorists like ripples from a stone thrown 
in water, arranging themselves into ever wider circles of support. These are the target groups 
which need to be won over by the authorities. When central authorities lump them all together, 
they risk alienating and loosing the very people they so desperately need to win over, fi nding 
themselves in direct confrontation with them in the fi ght against terrorists by non-terrorist 
means. In order to stage a comprehensive struggle against terrorism, the central authority and 
ruling elite have to understand the wider picture; meet the needs of the sympathizers and 
defuse the grievances of the supporters. Then the armed militia will appear as mere terrorists 
rather than as representatives of an excluded and oppressed wider group.
3. Important as it may be, intelligence gathering may ignore the full social, cultural 
and economic background of a given confl ict and concentrate on the security angle 
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of the phenomenon. “Human intelligence” comprising attitudes and sentiments; fears 
and expectation may be left out of the equation. When what should on the whole be 
a civilian endeavour or a scientifi c eff ort is reduced to a one-dimensional information 
gathering the full extent of the confl ict or insurgence may not be understood, as was the 
case in Iraq. The American military and intelligence communities never understood the 
human aspects of the “Iraqi problem” and lost. In the end, the analyses made are usually 
reduced merely to a body count and territory held. This is a completely spurious kind 
of success. Penetrating terrorist organizations is hard. For example, PKK terrorists live in 
caves and barely accessible camps and it is very hard to infi ltrate such groups. Radical 
religious organisations are even harder to penetrate because they recruit their members 
from the Koranic schools when they are still tiny children. Later they become members 
of diff erent orders, still later become organised politically and fi nally receive military 
training in distant camps where they are further radicalised. Without understanding 
their cultural and psychological qualities, these organisations cannot be understood 
and eliminated. It requires diff erent approaches than classical intelligence techniques; 
otherwise there is a danger of “killing the mosquitoes without drying up the swamp”. 
That is why counterterrorism eff orts should not be limited to merely military or police 
methods. Otherwise, we may never grasp the larger picture – the social, economic and 
cultural background. A national security agency should be created with responsibility 
for surveying attitudes, analysing scientifi c and factual data from diff erent sources, 
intelligence reports etc., it must also coordinate and integrate various counter terrorism 
activities carried out by diff erent government agencies. 
4. Terrorist militia must be diff erentiated from the population which actively and 
passively supports them, which ought to be the real target audience. For, it is the sup-
porters that confer a degree of legitimacy on the terrorists by responding positively to 
their hopes, demands and goals especially when they go as far as the ultimate sacrifi ce 
of loosing their lives for the common “cause”. This legitimacy aff ords a “representative” 
status to the terrorist group, if the central authority does not allow for the emergence 
of legal representatives and alternative leadership with a negotiable peaceful agenda. 
Hence denying terrorists popular support goes beyond mere counter–violence or anti-
terrorist tactics. Public denigration or replacement of the community leaders may work 
against the culture that is based on respect for the elder and loyalty and submission to 
local community leaders. By insulting the leaders, whole communities can be lost. During 
imprisonment, if such people are tortured and insulted for belonging to a particular 
group, the whole cultural group can be lost, not only because they are cruelly treated 
but also because they are discriminated against. The balance sheet has to be reviewed 
periodically to assess the effi  ciency of the policies employed as well as the damage 
caused when the wrong policies/implementations are used. If the latter are not changed, 
enforcement may cause more damage than improvement.
5. Another lesson to be learnt is that an armed extremist group should never be used to 
eliminate another extreme group. In Turkey, Hezbollah was born out of the frustration of 
the merchants and craftsmen of small towns in the South East. The increasing number 
and volume of extortions by the PKK in the name of ‘revolutionary tax’ devastated their 
businesses. Out of this frustration, an alternative Kurdish group emerged to fi ght back 
and forced the PKK out of these towns in several years (late 1980s). The offi  cials seized 
the opportunity. It is one of the best known secrets of Turkish politics, that the state 
organs supported this equally terrorist organisation. However, in time Hezbollah proved 
to be more cruel and lethal since there were no limitations to their crimes and no moral 
boundaries. They had legitimised their lethal actions with religion and divine call. The 
dictum that “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” is totally wrong and spurious; “my enemy’s 
enemy is its enemy and might be my future enemy as well”, and Turkey is not the only 
example of this lesson to be learnt.
6. Marshalling international legal norms in counterterrorism and stigmatizing terrorism 
as an infringement of human rights, pushes terrorist tactics towards the margins of legiti-
macy. Yet, some governments that apply brute force without the support of soft power 
that involves economic, cultural and social inputs often overlook this phenomenon. 
These stringent measures may be accompanied by what may be called “extraordinary 
laws” such as martial law and other legal tools that may fall short of the principle of rule 
of law during implementation. Thus, what is offi  cially labelled as “terrorism” is bracketed 
under the heading of ‘violence-and-counter terrorism’ is not allowed to be anything 
other than terrorism. It is in this context that we see a legitimate organization such as 
the state reverting to illegitimate means and seeking the assistance of irresponsible 
secret organizations. The existence and excesses of such clandestine illegal organisations 
further alienate people and weakens their trust in the state as a non-partisan and just 
power that can solve problems. In short the state (with all of its organizations) must 
be part of the solution not the problem. Failure in this respect may further extend and 
expand the confl ict.
7. Law enforcement agencies must be provided with a strategy to deal with terrorism. 
Members, at least the leading members, of such agencies must be equipped with the 
power of innovative analysis fl exible enough to adapt to changing circumstances. The 
analytical capabilities of law enforcement agencies must be constantly improved, staff ed 
by agents capable of independent analysis who have access to necessary information 
and intelligence. It is often the case that the police, military, gendarmerie and central or 
national intelligence services work by themselves, withholding critical information from 
each other. Institutional ‘exclusiveness’ often blurs the whole picture or prevents the full 
understanding of a complex phenomenon as terrorism. If this is the case, governments that 
fi ght with terrorism may never see the connections between smuggling, border violations 
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and other criminal activities, and terrorism. Also the link between terrorism fi nancing and 
racketeering enterprise can not been thoroughly investigated and established. The Finance 
Minister should create a unit to deal with foreign asset control, which would be dedicated 
to the issue of terrorist fundraising.
8. Another explanation of the only limited success achieved in law enforcement is due to 
concerns of incrimination of offi  cials and offi  cial institutions. The duties, responsibilities, 
powers and authorities of each agent and institution in the enforcement sector must be 
clearly defi ned and bound by law so that the extent of their legal competence is clearly 
known not only to them, but also to the wider public, which will therefore be aware 
when they are acting in breach of the law.
9. We are faced with a diff erent kind of terrorism in the world today that defi es the 
existing world order which it denounces as unjust, discriminatory and exclusively Western. 
The perpetrators are so committed they are prepared to sacrifi ce themselves to help 
bring about the birth of a new order that will rise from the debris of the existing one. 
They recognise no limits and boundaries in their actions, because they only represent 
a retaliation against cruelty, humiliation and destruction brought upon them by the West. 
They diff er in mentality from other terrorist groups and harbour diff erent values, which are 
incomprehensible with the positivist point of view we are used to. In the realm of religious 
terrorism, there are two leads to follow: deviance from the existing religious training. 
In the Turkish case, traditional religious training is carried out and supervised by the 
offi  cial Administration of Religious Aff airs. It is fashioned after the Sunni (Hanefi  School) 
interpretation of Islam, aiming to create individuals who are pious, conservative and 
obedient to the existing worldly authority. However, in the past two decades a diff erent, 
unoffi  cial religious training has penetrated Turkey, emanating from and fi nanced by Saudi 
Arabia and fashioned on the Wahhabi Salafi  tradition which advocates Jihadism (holy 
war in the name of religion). Its adherents see all parts of the world and all communities 
other than their own or which they fail to control as the “house of war”. This alternative 
training produced or converted approximately 350 young people who received training 
in Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and fought in Chechnya, Bosnia, and Kashmir and now 
in Iraq. This religious training is totally political and wants to transform the world into 
a Muslim caliphate. The converted believe that the community of believers is surrounded 
by “near” and “distant” enemies. The near enemies are the oppressive governments of 
Muslim countries that are corrupt and insensitive to the needs of their peoples. The distant 
enemy is the USA and Israel. A global system that sustains the control of the distant enemy, 
as the masters of the world must be got rid of. This is a life-and-death matter and they 
stake all they have on this struggle. The “jihadi” agents, training sites, publications, and 
fi nancial transactions must be monitored at all times throughout the world. This requires 
international cooperation and brings us to the last point or lesson.
10. International cooperation is a must in counterterrorism because most often terrorists 
and their deeds transcend national boundaries. However, international cooperation is very 
much wanting in this area. This is true even in the case of cooperation between the U.S. 
and Europe and among European countries. The case is even worse between the Middle 
Eastern countries where adversaries are more abundant than allies. Countries that have 
unsettled scores with their neighbours often support terrorists or treated them leniently 
which facilitates the transmission of terrorism across national boundaries. Yet terrorism 
is like a sword without the handle; at the end it cuts the hands of its holder. The radical 
Kurdish organization, PKK has been supported by Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece against Turkey. 
Now with the exception of the last of those named, all three have problems with their own 
Kurds. Needless to say, today they need Turkey’s support in surmounting this problem. 
Without such cooperation, it is very hard to deal with terrorism at the international level.
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Identifying the enemy
The problem of identifying the enemy in democratic societies through profi ling entire 
publics, societies, and communities, or sections of them, is becoming the primary challenge 
for Europe in the fi eld of counterterrorism. Until recent years, there were only two major 
terrorist groups in Europe, which were part of ethnic-national separatism – the Irish IRA and 
the Basque ETA, which were focused on attacking local targets in their own countries. Until 
the 1980´s, other national groups included mainly various factions of the PLO (Palestine 
Liberation Organization), which used Europe as an arena for attacking Israeli and Jewish 
targets, and the Kurdish-Turkish PKK emerged. There is also an issue of non-European 
targets, which can be attacked on European soil, too; the embassies and offi  cials of the 
United States and Israel as well as the dissidents from Arab and Muslim countries, for 
instance. Global Jihad poses a new kind of threat; it appeals to large segments of younger 
generations of Muslim communities. 
All the above-mentioned elements create a problem where there are certain “foreign” 
communities, which might potentially serve as a recruiting ground for terrorism; yet, the 
majority of them are not at all involved in any phase of terrorism or political violence. 
However, terrorist groups emerge from within communities that serve as a hothouse for 
contingent risk. This hothouse is also encouraging public support for alienation and some 
violent forms of protest and sympathy or at least understanding of the roots of violence. 
The processes of European integration might develop a growing tension between 
nationalism of the various countries and pan-European nationalism in the future. Against 
this background, there are signs of growing solidarity and sense of brotherhood among 
the entire Muslim population in Europe, and of a “clash of unifying processes”. 
There are several elements that make this issue crucial, especially while countering Jihadi-
Salafi  terrorism: 
■  Home grown terrorists, second and even third generations of emigrants with identity 
crises, social alienation, cultural and social diffi  culties coping with modernization, crises 
of local community leaderships, the infl uence of local Islamist leaders and clerics, the 
role of mosques and Islamic social and welfare infrastructure, culture clash, the “shield” 
of familiar Arab culture, and new young groups of Jihad-seekers.
■  Links to the Arab or Muslim homelands and the infl uence of internal aff airs in the 
various Arab countries or the entire Arab world – opposition to secular governments, 
the failure of Arab nationalism, leadership crises in the Arab world, the occupation of 
and insurgency in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, fundamental anti-Americanism 
that is shared by parts of European societies, and oppressive Arab governments. 
■  European liberalism, the encouragement of immigration, the fear of “clash of religions” 
between Christianity and Islam, the diff erentiation of worldviews and perceptions 
regarding the separation of state and religion, the role and responsibility of religious 
institutions in society, the potential confl ict between state law (man-made) and the 
Islamic law (divine), fears of racial trends in Europe, the former history of oppression of 
religions and ethnic groups, the former “demons” in Europe, the existing ethnic confl icts 
in Eastern and Western Europe, some open (former Yugoslavia, the Basques, Irish in 
Northern- Ireland) and some hidden (Belgium, Scottish or Catalonian separatism).
■  Currently emerging Jihadi terrorism has the global nature of transnational terrorism 
and networking, Global Jihadi strategy is to develop a new kind of transnational religio- 
political nationalism of the Ummah – the global Islamic nation. Within this sphere, 
Muslims view themselves as facing a global attack; the whole world becomes an arena 
for retaliation. Moreover, the global Jihad creates a sense of strong solidarity; any problem, 
confl ict, or threat to a Muslim community is viewed as a threat for the entire Muslim world. 
Therefore, Jihadi terrorism in Europe can be motivated by many reasons, not only the 
European ones – Iraq, Afghanistan, the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict or by perceived attacks 
against religion (the Van Gogh murder). Interestingly, the Muslim or Islamic campaigns 
which were directly connected to Europe, like the Danish cartoons, French veil law or the 
social-ethnic riots in France and Belgium, did not actually lead to  acts of terrorism. 
■  In democratic and liberal societies it is not easy to create laws containing measures 
on profi ling communities, religions, charities, or other risky groupings and activities. 
In Europe in the post-Cold War era, it is even diffi  cult to defi ne the fi eld of political 
subversion and hence, to counter it. 
■  There are certain Islamic organizations, neighbourhoods or public groupings that might 
pose a threat and in democratic societies; they can also easily create other institutions 
which act as a cover for their activities – for example, mosques, student institutions, 
charities, certain types of NGOs, bookstores, social and welfare institutions, circles of 
clerics, etc. The virtual infl uence through the Internet can be added to it nowadays, 
originating both in Europe and mainly in the Arab and Muslim homelands. The majority 
of the Internet activities and groupings aim at promoting both the ideology of globaliz-
ing Jihad and the global solidarity but countering the dangerous use of the Internet is 
problematic in a democratic society. 
■  The Jihadi phenomenon is still unfamiliar to the West in general and in Europe in 
particular; disseminated mainly in Arabic, containing a diff erent mindset and values, it 
resonates among a large segment of second and third generations of emigrants who 
prefer to prevent themselves developing close ties to the majority societies. 
The Israeli parallel to the Muslim communities 
in Europe – the Israeli-Arab citizens
There are about 950.000 Israeli-Arab citizens out of 6.5 million Israeli citizens; that is 
14.6 %, and about 250.000 Arab residents in East Jerusalem who are not citizens of Israel; 
all together they represent 18.4 % of the total population of Israel. About 82 % of them are 
Reuven Paz Find the Needle in the Haystack: Profiling Risky Communities and Groups of Citizens  
Muslims, the rest are Druze and members of various Christian churches or communities 
who do not pose any greater potential threat than, say, dissident Jews. Despite the discrimi-
nation claims, justifi ed or not, the Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy full rights of citizenship; i.e. 
representation in the elected Israeli institutions, independent municipalities, educational 
system, and an independent civil society. They concentrate on the three main regions 
creating a majority in certain parts of them, and therefore enjoy a sense of cultural and 
social autonomy. 
On the other hand, they are an integral part of the Palestinian people and the Arab 
nation, which is in a state of violent confl ict with Israel, which is their country of residence 
and citizenship. This is a very diffi  cult situation with no promise of change in the near future. 
The Israeli-Arab citizens enjoy freedom of political activity, speech, and institutions, and at 
the same time they are exposed to the doctrines, policy, communication and messages of 
the Arab world and the Palestinians, including the anti-Israeli one. There is quite a large 
Israeli-Islamic movement, which is politically, socially, religiously and culturally a sister 
movement to Hamas. The movement is integral part of the Israeli democratic political 
process; it has three representatives (out of 120) in the Israeli parliament, and dozens in 
municipality councils. 
The Arab Muslim community in Israel is one of the youngest in the world with an average 
age of 18.5 years, compared to the average of 31.5 years among the Israeli Jews. In some 
communities, namely among the Bedouins of South Israel who are completely Muslims, the 
average age is only as high as 13 years1; the young alienated population is always a source 
of security threat. The demographic process clearly favours the Israeli-Arab population and 
looking at Palestine in its entirety, Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it is permanently in 
favour of the Palestinians. At present, there are about 5.5 millions Jews and about 3.5 millions 
Arabs in the whole of Palestine, in about 20 years, the number might be roughly equal. The 
Israeli-Arab citizens often have family members or relatives among the Palestinian Diaspora 
and they are exposed to values of “tribal loyalties”, which are stronger than the loyalty to the 
nation-state in general, and Israel in particular. The rate of Arab criminal activity in Israel is 
about 24 %, in case of juvenile criminal activity reaches about 28.5 %. Given the percentage 
if Israeli-Arab population, it is another signifi cant sign of alienation from the majority society, 
from the state and possible breeding ground for political violence and terrorism. There can 
be also separatist tendencies among the Arab-Israeli citizens as well as the growing sense 
of autonomy and demand for political self-organization. 
The other security risks related to terrorism include Arab, primarily Syrian, state 
sponsored terrorism, the attacks against target of a “soft belly” nature, i.e. Israeli tourists, 
diplomats, embassies and primarily Jewish targets and around the world, i.e. synagogues, 
community centres, clerics, individuals, cemeteries, and Palestinian Islamist or national 
terrorism originating in the PA territories. 
1)  Identical to Gaza
Arab-Israeli involvement in terrorism
Despite the facts mentioned, the direct and indirect risk of involvement of the Israeli-Arab 
citizens in Jihadi or nationalist terrorism is relatively low. In the period 1948-19652, there was 
no act of terrorism carried out by Israeli-Arab citizens at all. There were few cases of logistic 
support by Bedouins in the South to Palestinian Fidayeens who carried out the terrorist 
attacks through the borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Egyptian-controlled Gaza. There were 
many cases in the Galilee3 of espionage for the Syrian intelligence, largely undertaken by 
smuggling through the borders and using family connections. This involvement was mostly 
caused by money or family ties, not by ideology; and the espionage was not only quite 
primitive but also harmless, since the Israeli-Arab citizens were totally excluded from any 
work in the Israeli security infrastructure. Furthermore, until 1966, the Israeli-Arab citizens 
were controlled by the military and limited in their movements. 
In the period 1965-19874 and especially after June 1967, Israel experienced a growing 
involvement of Israeli-Arab citizens in terrorism, sponsored and carried out by the various 
factions of the PLO. In 1968-1973, about 450 Israeli-Arabs were prosecuted and imprisoned 
for terrorism; only 40 of them acted on their own initiative, the others were part of some 
70 groups or cells detected. All the groups were initiated, sponsored or organized as part of 
the PLO factions. The period between 1973 and 1978 was marked by a signifi cant decline 
of their involvement in Palestinian terrorism, as a result of the internal factors, which will 
be explained below and a change of PLO attitudes, and those of its largest fraction Fatah, 
towards the Israeli-Arabs. The PLO found the political struggle within the Israeli society 
(promoting the support for Palestinian independent state) to be more fruitful; another 
new PLO policy was to organize the Israeli-Arabs into an autonomous community at the 
socio-political level. 
The period 1978-1980 is a turning point, marked by the self-organization of large 
Islamist Jihadi group of Israeli-Muslims5, infl uenced by the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
in the Arab world. The fi rst pilgrimage of Israeli-Muslims to Mecca took place in 1978 and 
Israeli-Muslims went to study in the Islamic colleges in the West-Bank for the fi rst time. 
Also the organized movement and infrastructure of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in 
Gaza and the West Bank emerged at that period; however, unlike the PLO, the then Muslim 
Brotherhood was not at all involved in any form of terrorism6.
Since the outbreak of the fi rst Intifada in December 1987, there have been on average 
60-70 Israeli-Arabs arrested a year, despite a signifi cant population growth in real terms 
and the high proportion of youngsters. Also in the past three years, the number of Muslims 
2)  On 1 January 1965, the fi rst terrorist operation by Fatah was carried out.
3)  Northern Israel
4)  The fi rst Intifada started in December 1987. 
5)  The group included about 75 people, divided into three branches.
6)  Also their socio-political infrastructure was approved and legalized by Israel. 
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arrested on charges of terrorism has declined. During this period, the main involvement of 
Israeli-Muslims in terrorism has been in logistical support, such as driving the Palestinian 
suicide bombers, smuggling weapons from the PA territories, hosting terrorists in the 
safe-houses, or providing information for terrorist operations. There are only two cases of 
Israeli-Muslims carrying out direct attacks – in 1990 by a group of members of the Israeli-
Islamic movement against IDF soldiers, and an individual suicide bomber, 44-year-old 
married member of the Islamic movement7. 
In general, the number of Israeli-Arabs involved in terrorism is rather small, and since 1973 
they have only been Muslim. It is quite surprising given their number, involvement in the 
Israeli society, free movement, good knowledge of the language and culture, and the intensity 
of Palestinian terrorism against Israel. Yet, two elements should be noted. First, even though 
the number is very small, it is still very diffi  cult to fi nd small groups, or individuals among 
quite a large segment of the Israeli society. Profi ling them as Arabs or Muslims is relatively 
useful, but in a democratic open society it is very problematic. Secondly, the background 
remains – the complete exposure of the Israeli-Muslims to the anti-Israeli propaganda and 
incitement, the family ties, the violent clashes with the Israeli authorities, such as in October 
20008 and a constant feeling of discrimination, justifi ed or not. 
On this background, two observations should be made, which might be use as a lesson 
for Europe, too: 
■   The delicate and fragile boundary between individual or organized crime and terrorism; 
and criminal activity as a refl ection of socio-political alienation from the state and from 
the majority society; and socio-economic conditions that encourage criminal activity. 
■   The delicate and fragile boundary between political subversion and terrorism. Political 
subversion works in the “grey zone” and is diffi  cult to be defi ned on the legal level. In the 
Islamist case, subversion is not only public or open incitement through speeches, sermons, 
writings, or web sites. It is also the entire or part of Da’wah activity – welfare charities, 
mosques, religious study circles, and other forms of organizations and institutions. 
Internal factors aff ecting involvement 
of Israeli-Arabs in terrorism
■  The Israeli Communist Party, which served as a block against terrorism, as a result of 
the policy of the Soviet Union, which kept the orthodox Communist parties out of 
illegal activity. During the period 1949-1990, the Party became the main political power 
among the Israeli-Arabs, even though it has always been a Jewish-Arab party, and until 
7)  Also an Israeli-Muslim girl planned a suicide attack after she fell in love with a Palestinian Fatah operative, but was imprisoned prior to the operation. 
8)  12 Israeli citizens and one Palestinian were killed by police. 
the mid-1970´s its leadership was mainly composed of Jews and Arab Greek-Orthodox-
ies. It was responsible for three main processes among the Israeli-Arab citizens: 
 1. The legitimacy of the Israeli Jewish state as part of Soviet public policy. 
 2. The focus on the political struggle only, including within the framework of Israeli law.
 3.  The exploitation of the Israeli democracy in order to encourage Arab integration 
within Israel and not separatist tendencies, and the focus on a socio-political struggle 
for equal rights for Arabs and Jews. Hence, the party focused from 1949 on integra-
tion and participation in all the possible elections—parliamentary, municipal, labour 
unions, and all the other institutions of the Israeli civil society, in order to promote 
their status in Israel. 
■  Until 1967, Israeli-Arab citizens were regarded by the rest of the Arab world as traitors 
since they remained in the “Jewish State”, did not resist, preferred the socio-political 
struggle of the Communist party, and were totally disconnected from the rest of the 
Arab world and most of the Palestinian Diasporas, except for the border with Lebanon 
and the Palestinian refugee camps there. 
■  Since the mid-1970´s, the PLO started establishing offi  cial and unoffi  cial connections 
with Israeli-Arab and Jewish groups. The fi rst offi  cial meeting was held in Prague in 
1976 between the representative of the PLO and the leadership of the Israeli Communist 
party, which opened political and later on fi nancial support by the PLO for several 
Arab-Israeli organizations in order to take advantage of their position in Israel to exert 
political pressure and secure achievements. From then on, the Palestinian factions in 
general, led by the leadership of the PLO/Fatah kept a non-violent role for the Israeli-
Arabs, unlike their brothers in the territories. 
■  In 1966, the military rule over the Arabs in Israel was removed, which started a relatively 
speedy process of better integration in most fi elds of civil society. It gradually led to 
a new self-perception on the part of the primarily Muslim Israeli-Arabs, namely that they 
had a lot to lose if they entered a violent clash with the Israeli authorities. Further and 
better integration into Israeli society in the 1990´s, in addition to the decline in their 
relative percentage-weight in Israel as a result of the immigration of over one-million 
Jews from the former Soviet Union, has strengthened the notion that they should focus 
on the struggle for equality within Israel and within the limits set by the existing law. 
The situation of the Arab citizens in Israel is far from being satisfactory for both sides, 
either on the level of societies or the relations with the authorities. Mutual suspicion 
exists and will be on-going for several decades. 
Relevant factors in Israeli security policy 
■  Intelligence – One of the most signifi cant elements of public security in profi ling the 
most dangerous groups within a certain minority group or community is the effi  ciency 
of the intelligence and information gathered by the security service. Already in the 
Reuven Paz Find the Needle in the Haystack: Profiling Risky Communities and Groups of Citizens 
early 1950´s Israel established a very effi  cient system for collecting information through 
profi ling priorities and degrees of the risky groups out of the entire “suspected” popula-
tion. It does not only concern the planned terrorist attacks but also delivers a thorough 
knowledge of the entire Israeli-Arab population with a focus on political subversion 
as the main fi eld leading to terrorism. Following the thin line between terrorism and 
criminal activity, the cooperation, coordination, and sharing of information between 
all the security and law-enforcement agencies is crucial. 
■  Education and Public Awareness – Following a long experience of intensive terro-
rism, the Israeli public, certainly in the case of the Jewish population and mostly in the 
case of the Arab, is very much aware of possible terrorist attacks. The public is aware of 
suspected objects or prepared for intensive security checks in public places. In many 
cases, the Jewish public is alerted by the presence of people of Arab appearance, or 
the use of the Arabic language. The majority of the Israeli-Jewish public cannot diff er 
between an Israeli-Arab and a Palestinian from the PA. In many cases Israeli Jews of 
Middle Eastern origin have been suspected, too. The public awareness and many phy-
sical security facilities deter terrorists from carrying out operations. Another important 
element to note here is compulsory military service for all Jews and the permission to 
carry weapons quite freely, which has already proved to be useful in many cases, when 
citizens managed to thwart terrorism or even to arrest or injure terrorists before or after 
their operation. 
■  Identifi cation – For many reasons, not just security, religion is registered in the Israeli 
IDs, which eases the security checks. 
■  Israeli-Arabs are in most cases excluded from any job which is directly or indirectly 
connected to security or sensitive matters. There has been a gradual change in this 
fi eld since 1948 as a result of a signifi cant increase of the number of Israeli-Arabs with 
higher education, and the consistently small number of Arab citizens who have taken 
part in hostile activities. 
■  Social infl uence – The mid-1970´s were a turning point both in the relations between 
the Israeli-Arab citizens and the Israeli state, and Israeli-Arab citizens and Jewish society. 
Above all it marked a start of socio-economic progress as a result of meeting with the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. On the political level, it was a period in which 
identifi cation with Palestinian nationalism and the involvement in Israeli politics within 
the Arab national parties deepened, and many NGOs emerged. Yet, all these activities 
led mostly to further political subversion and protests within the Israeli law. On the 
socio-economic level, their struggle for equality as Israeli-Arab/Palestinian citizens 
within Israel strengthened and the diff erences between them and the Palestinians in 
the territories grew. During the 1980´s and later on, especially after the Oslo accords and 
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, it became clear that any political 
solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict does not include them. The Israeli authorities 
and Jewish society also “allowed” them to maintain a socio-political struggle within 
the Israeli political “rules of the game.” Economically, and in some ways even culturally, 
the diff erences between Israeli-Arabs and the Palestinians kept growing, too, resulting 
into a notion that “they have a lot to lose” by acting against the state through political 
violence or terrorism. 
Conclusion
The relative success of the Israeli counter-terrorism policy, especially regarding Isra-
eli-Arab citizens, is the result not only of the deployment of effi  cient means and a good 
intelligence infrastructure, but also of the integration of the Israeli-Arabs into the Israeli 
society; at least as far as the aspects aff ecting recruitment for terrorism are concerned. 
Three fundamental points should be noted as a reminder of what might happen in the 
future in Europe: the fi rst is the importance of profi ling individuals or groups with the 
most secrecy and sensitivity. The European case is more diffi  cult than the Israeli one, since 
these groups or individuals do not face any military hostilities from their mother countries. 
European countries cannot impose certain limitations against their citizens; yet, the pro-
portion of illegal immigrants, primarily Muslims, in Western Europe may enable European 
governments to take such steps in the future. Secondly, socio-political integration is 
a key element in decreasing the risk of home grown terrorism.  Thirdly and fi nally, public 
awareness is a highly signifi cant element of counterterrorism policies. 
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QUESTIONS / COMMENTS AND ANSWERS
PANEL II
■  How did the Indian government manage to counter Sikh terrorism by focusing on com-
munity leadership? One of the big problems in Europe is the lack of leadership in the Muslim 
communities. 
■  Would a solution to the Israeli-Arab confl ict put an end to Islamist terrorism?
■  International cooperation and state-sponsored activities against Turkey by Iraq, Iran, 
Syria and Greece over the last 20 years – is it possible that this phenomenon could occur 
in Eastern Europe?
■  It was argued that terrorism is not a goal in itself, but as far as global terrorism is concerned, 
there are no specifi c goals declared. It is hard to imagine that Jihadi terrorists could achieve 




The government used a lot of Sikh symbols during the anti-terror campaign and the 
police leadership came from the Sikh community. The anti-terror campaign in Punjab 
was led by a Sikh Director General of Police, Mr. K.P.S. Gill. Even during communal riots in 
India, there is a tendency on the part of the government to use symbols from the com-
munities engaged in the confl ict in order to build confi dence among the people and calm 
passions. After the Mumbai train blasts in July 2006, the Muslim leadership responded 
well in terms of crisis management. The seven trains blasts were followed by another blast 
in a mosque and graveyard at Malegaon, near Mumbai, in which 13 Muslims died and 
it was interesting that the police patrolled the area with the local Imam. Together they 
appealed to the people to refrain from any sort of communal backlash. In view of the 
general complaints that the police in India have lost the trust of people, it was a strategic 
thing to do. The police in India need to restore the confi dence of the people by engaging 
the communities directly. 
Regarding the concept of terrorism as a means to and end, and not end in itself; if 
one studies global terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, one fi nds that they also started with 
particular goals like attacking the Saudi monarchy. However, they keep shifting their 
goals, a feature which is very typical of Jihadi organisations today. Any word with the 
suffi  x –‘ism’, like communism, fascism, capitalism, refers to a structure and a set of ideas 
and to a belief system. One cannot imagine an end product like a terrorist state ruled by 
complete anarchy. Al Qaeda is also aiming at the particular goal of an Islamic religious 
caliphate. Thus, terrorism is a strategy and even a tactic within the larger strategy. It is 
not an end in itself. I wanted to make the distinction between ends and means because 
of the debate on the freedom and independence movements, which use terrorism as 
tactics. When these movements use terrorism, with one act of terror they violate every 
ideal for which they claim to be struggling. The tough task today is to delegitimise terror 
as tactics and yet not take away from the legitimacy of some of the movements which 
are against foreign occupation and against state oppression.
Reuven Paz:
Firstly, it is obvious that the Israeli–Arab confl ict is used by Al Qaeda or by the other 
radical Islamic movements, to recruit more support and to justify part of their acts. What is 
the solution of the Israeli–Arab confl ict? The solution, which is accepted in the rest of the 
democratic world, is two states and a democratic Palestinian state; not a state controlled 
by Osama bin Laden or other Islamic groups but a state controlled either by Fatah or even 
by Hamas, which is moving more towards a nationalist movement than an Islamist one. In 
any case, Hamas is far from being similar to global jihadi movements. The best evidence 
is the attitude of Al Qaeda itself or the scholars who represent the global jihad, towards 
Hamas; they have been criticizing Hamas now for several years past, for diff erent reasons 
starting with “selling Palestine to the Jews”. They claim that there cannot be a compromise on 
Palestine; you want to either establish a true Islamic state all over Palestine, or stop fi ghting. 
Secondly, they claim that Jihad waged by Hamas is no longer a Jihad for Allah but a Jihad of 
a nationalist nature. Thirdly, during the second intifada, for example, when in some periods 
Hamas was supporting Yasir Arafat, the global Jihadists were very angry. Yasir Arafat, is for 
Al Qaeda, a symbol of despotism, dictatorship and of the oppression of Muslims, just like 
Hosni Mubarak or Saddam Hussein. The resolution of the Israeli-Arab confl ict by creating 
two modern states would not solve the problem of Jihadi terrorism; on the contrary, it might 
even increase it. It could add Palestine to the list of targets. We have to remember that the 
vast majority of Jihadi terrorism is targeting Muslims, not Christians, Jews or Westerners. 
Algeria, Iraq and Afghanistan are examples which prove this point.
One of the problems with the Jihadi groups is the fl uid defi nition of their enemy. The 
enemy is not just the West, the so-called “crusaders”, or Jews but also the Shias and others. 
A poor Egyptian worker, who went to Iraq to look for work and incidentally found it in an 
American company, is nowadays automatically an infi del. As an infi del, he is not only to be 
executed but also beheaded. So the enemy is “everybody who does not think like them”. 
I am not sure that we really understand what the goals of Al Qaeda are; at least of the 
traditional hard core. For them, cases like Chechnya or Bosnia provide an opportunity to take 
advantage of local confl icts in order to create more solidarity or bringing in more volunteers. 
The dream of bin Laden is perhaps that of using terrorism in, for example, Saudi Arabia, in 
order to destabilise it and provoke U.S. intervention. The occupation of Saudi Arabia would 
then create another wave of solidarity and recruitment, in order to fi ght for the liberation 
of the heart of Islam. The global Jihadists lack a political vision of what a Muslim state in 
modern times should look like.
Panel IIQuestions / Comments and Answers

Doğu Ergil:
Iran, Iraq, Syria and Greece had scores to settle with Turkey. Iran thinks Turkey is 
a strategic opponent in theatres like the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Syria 
wanted more headwaters of the trans-boundary waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. Greece 
has always felt threaten by Turkey because of various reasons, historical and otherwise. 
These countries committed the age-old mistake of befriending the enemies of their enemy. 
But now, Iran is dealing with the unruliness of its own Kurds. Iraq is hopelessly trying to 
deal with the demands for Kurdish independence while Syria is next in line. Only Greece 
has no Kurdish minority but she played the Kurdish card to deter Turkey from a possible 
belligerent act. Fortunately the political elite of this country realized in time that this was 
both dangerous and unethical and stopped its support of the PKK after this organization’s 
fugitive leader was detected in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi and arrested in 1999. It is after 
this date that Greece chose to support Turkey’s EU membership as the proper strategy for 
the resolution of its larger security concerns. 
However such a development is unlikely to happen between some of the countries 
in Eastern Europe. Although most of the countries in the region are or are becoming EU 
members, some others seem to be left out due to lack of shared principles or political 
alliances. This situation is pregnant with political problems for the near future, as those 
who are left out may seek to take their place in an illiberal alliance headed by Russia that 
appears to be increasingly in competition with the West. I feel there is a serious possibility 
of problems; how they will arise, and when, I cannot say. 
Questions / Comments and Answers
